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INTRODUCTION
Now fourteen years old, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
(Board or MSPB) has developed a sufficient track record in adjudi-
cating issues of federal employment law so that interested parties
can define and even predict the Board's official policies and innate
biases. One goal of this Article is to sketch some of the latest practi-
cal developments in federal employment law, while pausing to ex-
amine the underlying bases of certain documented trends in the
19931 SURVEY OF MSPB CASES IN 1991-1992 871
Board's approach to deciding these cases.' As a consequence, this
Article should be helpful to the practitioner, as well as stimulating to
the academician or the public policy pundit.2
Congress created the MSPB3 to guarantee compliance with fed-
eral merit systems principles by all federal governmental agencies. 4
The Board's stated mission is to ensure that federal employees are
protected against abuse by agency management, that Executive
branch agencies make employment decisions in accordance with
merit systems principles, and that federal agency personnel systems
are kept free of prohibited personnel practices. 5
1. This Article is limited by considerations of reasonable length. Therefore, although
billed as a survey of recent cases, the Article can address only a small portion of the issues on
the current menu at the MSPB. The authors have selected cases with the hope that others will
also find them significant, relevant, and interesting.
2. For other articles concerning topics related to federal employment law at the MSPB
prior to fiscal year 1991, see Symposium, Project on the Merit Systems Protection Board The Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, 29 How. LJ. 279 (1986); Michael Bogdanow, The Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board at Ten, 35 FED. B. NEws &J. 271 (1988); Bruce D. Fong, Whistleblower Protection and
the Office of Special Counsel The Development of Reprisal Law in the 1980s, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1015
(1991); Ramon V. Gomez, The Application of Collateral Estoppel in Proceedings Before the U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board, 39 LAB. L.J. 3 (1988); Katherine A. Klos, The Merit Systems Protection
Board's Application of the Community Rate Principle in Its Awards of Reasonable Attorney Fees, 39 LAB.
.J. 81 (1988); Andrew Rudyk, The Relationship Between Federal Sector Arbitration and the Merit
Systems Protection Board, 37 LAB. LJ. 372 (1986); Robert G. Vaughn, The Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 and Legal Regulation of Public Bureaucracies, 31 How. LJ. 187 (1988); Beth R. Kramer,
Note, The Federal Circuit's Clarification of MSPBJurisdiction: Thomas v. General Services Admin-
istration, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 1233 (1986).
3. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 202, 92 Stat.
1111, 1121-31 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989))
(amending tide 5 of U.S. Code to create MSPB, which is composed of three members ap-
pointed by President by and with consent of Senate, and of which not more than two can be of
same political party).
4. 5 C.F.R. § 1200.1 (1992). In order to ensure that the most effective civil service
exists, civil servants are "hired and removed on the basis of merit" by a system that is account-
able to the public through its elected leaders. S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2724-25. Federal merit systems focus on competence
rather than on political or personal favoritism as the basis for selecting and advancing civil
service employees. Id at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2725.
5. U.S. MERrr Sys. PROTECTION BD., ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991 7 [hereinaf-
ter 1991 ANNUAL REPORT]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (b) (1988) (establishing merit system princi-
ples in areas of (a) recruitment, (b) fair and equitable treatment, (c) pay schedule, (d) conduct,
(e) efficiency, (0 performance, (g) training, (h) personal and political behavior, and (i)
whistleblowing); 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 3 (summarizing MSPB fiscal year 1991 activi-
ties furthering Board's mission). The introductory letter of the 1991 Annual Report
indicates:
[D]uring the fiscal year, administrative judges in the Board's regional offices issued
almost 8400 decisions on appeals, stay requests, and addendum cases. The three-
member bipartisan Board issued over 1800 decisions on review of administrative
judges' decisions and in reopened cases.
1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 3.
It is worth noting that the MSPB has, according to 1991 figures, a total staff complement of
302 employees, including 132 attorneys. Id at 50-51. The MSPB also performs important
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) oversight functions and plays a significant role in
reporting to Congress and the President on current issues in the federal employment and
merit systems arenas. See id. at 16-17 (enumerating broad scope of Board's oversight function
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Increasingly, disputed federal agency personnel actions not re-
solved prior to a hearing are upheld at virtually every stage of the
appeals process, whether before an administrative judge (AJ), the
full Board, 6 or on review before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. 7 Thus, attorneys representing federal employees
before the MSPB may do well to heed one of the guiding principles
of administrative law, which admonishes practitioners to win at the
agency level or prepare for a difficult journey through the appeals
gauntlet.8 It should be emphasized, however, that despite data indi-
cating a prohibitively high rate of sustained agency decisions heard
on appeal by the MSPB, the overwhelming majority of agency ac-
tions appealed to the MSPB are dismissed, settled, or mitigated
without so much as a hearing.9 The Board understandably enrcour-
ages its AJs to utilize a variety of alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques10 to aid the efficient and timely disposition of appeals."
General MSPB deference to the personnel decisions of the vari-
ous federal agencies produces, from one viewpoint, a pillar of prece-
with respect to OPM policies, regulations, and actions). For the benefit of the practicing at-
torney, however, this Article is limited to providing commentary and analysis regarding the
most recent, significant cases and trends under the Board's adjudicative functions.
6. See 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 30-33 (reporting that of 2015 appeals adju-
dicated by Board's AJs, approximately 1592 or 79% of decisions upheld agency action). The
number of agency actions upheld increased two percent from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year
1991. See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990 30 (here-
inafter 1990 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting that of 2010 appeals adjudicated in fiscal year 1990,
Board upheld 1542 or 77% of agency actions).
7. See 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (stating in introductory letter to Presi-
dent that 95% of all final Board decisions reviewed by U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal
Circuit remained unchanged in 1991); 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 (stating in
introductory letter to President that U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit upheld 97% of
Board's final decisions during fiscal year 1990).
8. See 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29:16, 29:27, at 399-404,
458-59 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing judicial deference for agencies' interpretation of law).
9. See 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 29-31 (reporting that in fiscal year 1991,
2033 appeals or 27% of all initial agency decisions appealed to MSPB were settled, 3477
appeals or 49% were dismissed, and 103 appeals or 17 were mitigated); see also supra note 7
and accompanying text (listing high percentage of MSPB decisions sustained on appeal to
Federal Circuit).
10. See Daniel R. Levinson, Quayle Law Reforms and the MSPB, 1 FED. CIR. BJ. 1, 1-4
(1951) (discussing Board's attempts to reduce costs and delays in litigation at AJ and Board
level through use of pretrial devices, effective case management, more effective trial proce-
dures, and explicit encouragement of alternative dispute resolution techniques).
11. See 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 28-30 (listing various techniques, including
use ofprehearing conferences, to facilitate exchanges and suggest possible solutions between
parties). The Board adds that "because these processes are voluntary, the parties surrender
no rights if an agreement is not reached, and the case proceeds to adjudication." Id at 30.
Perhaps the "technique" most useful to the regular practitioner is simple awareness of the
Board's AJs' willingness to dismiss appeals without prejudice in order to facilitate case organi-
zation and "exchanges" between parties while allowing appellants to refile at a later date. See
infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text (discussing tendency of AJs to dismiss cases with-
out prejudice, where employee may be disadvantaged by proceeding with hearing or granting
continuance, to allow employee to refile when prepared to proceed).
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dent after which a federal employee can model his or her conduct to
avoid suffering adverse employment actions and to advance within
the merit system.12 The sum of these MSPB decisions also can be
viewed as creating a framework, or a decisional "manager's hand-
book," from which supervisors may draw guidance to take lawful
personnel actions to "promote the efficiency of the service."13
From the viewpoint of the employment law practitioner, however,
who proposes to represent federal employees and, under certain cir-
cumstances, their supervisors, paradoxical situations arise despite
the apparent and intended consistency of MSPB decisions.
I. WHISTLEBLOWER CASES
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) 14 significantly
expanded the Board's jurisdiction 15 and, since its enactment, has in-
creasingly provided opportunities for the practitioner in the govern-
ment employment law field.16 Commentators expressed hope that
passage of the Act would clarify the Board's approach to
whistleblower cases and ease the burden on the federal employee
12. See supra notes 7-8, infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (addressing general
trend supporting agency personnel actions through appeals process and stating that MSPB
will not scrutinize reasons motivating agency personnel actions applying interim relief.
13. See G.JERRY SHAW & WILLIAM L. BRANSFORD, THE FEDERAL MANAGER'S HANDBOOK: A
GUIDE TO REHABILITATING OR REMOVING THE PROBLEM EMPLOYEE 4 (1992) (advising federal
managers on ways to promote efficiency of agency service in cases involving employee mis-
conduct and unacceptable employee performance). The "efficiency of the service" standard
must be met by an agency manager to justify taking a personnel action based on employee
misconduct under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503, 7513 (1988). SHAW & BRANSFORD, supra, at 4. Sections
7503 and 7513 do not define "efficiency of the service," but the MSPB set forth definitional
guidelines in Burkwist v. Department of Transp., 26 M.S.P.R. 427, 428-30 (1985) (establish-
ing that Board will uphold disciplinary action to ensure "efficiency of the service" where
agency has shown nexus between employee's off-duty misconduct and his or her poor per-
formance ofjob duties and responsibilities); see also SHAW & BRANSFORD, supra, at 11 (noting
that agency seeking to justify adverse personnel action based on misconduct must show nexus
between grounds for action and employee's ability to satisfactorily perform duties, agency's
ability to fulfill its mission, or other legitimate governmental interest promoting "efficiency of
the service"). Interested persons may order the Federal Manager's Handbook: A Guide to Rehabil-
itating or Removing the Problem Employee from MPC Publications, P.O. Box 66834, Washington,
D.C., 20035-6834.
14. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. III 1991) (creating additional "individual right of action"
(IRA) appeal to allow current, former, or prospective employees to pursue claim before Board
after first consulting with Office of Special Counsel (OSC) regarding any personnel action
taken or proposed to be taken because of whistleblowing activity; right of action continues to
exist despite fact that OSC may refuse to prosecute case); see also 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 5, at 28 (reporting that impact of additional IRA appeal route has been substantial, as
evidenced by fact that of 471 whistleblower appeals decided by Board during fiscal year 1991,
196 were IRA cases).
16. See 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 15 (implying that opportunities for practi-
tioners have increased and noting that Board decided 252 whistleblower appeals in fiscal year
1990); see also 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 (noting increase to 471 whistleblower
appeals in fiscal year 1991).
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who has been adversely affected because of making protected disclo-
sures. 17 While this was accomplished in part, it was not successful
for all federal employees.
A. The Whistleblower Protection Act and Title 38 Employees: Will the
Board Recognize Protection Under Title 38 Amendments?
1. Recent cases
Traditionally, the Board has refused to afford title 38 employees18
protection from whistleblower reprisal under the WPA. 19 For ex-
ample, in Alvarez v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 20 the Board rea-
soned that, because the title 38 personnel system provides its own
procedures for appeals of adverse actions, appeals under the WPA
would be inconsistent with this independent disciplinary and appel-
late scheme and therefore contrary to the express language of title
38.21 Practitioners should note, however, that an anomaly in the
17. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 2(b), 103 Stat.
16, 16 (reprinted at 5 U.S.C. § 1201 note (Supp. 11989)) (declaring that purpose of WPA is to
"strengthen and improve protection for the rights of Federal employees, to prevent reprisals,
and to help eliminate wrongdoing within the Government"); President Bush's Remarks on
Signing the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, PUB. PAPERS 391, 391-92 (Apr. 10, 1989)
(expressing determination shared with Congress that whistleblowers not be "fired or rebuked
or suffer financially for their honesty and good judgment" and clarifying that whistleblowers
may use WPA to take their cases to MSPB); see also Fong, supra note 2, at 1061-62. Fong
characterizes the WPA as turning the clock back to 1979, when both the Civil Service Reform
Act (CSRA) and reprisal law were in their earliest phase, as follows:
With the recent passage of the WPA amendments, the federal civil service begins its
next decade under the CSRA with new standards designed to ease the burden on
employees and the OSC to prove that employees have been disadvantaged by their
whistleblowing. The congressional creators of whistleblower protection firmly re-
jected the law's development at the Board and in the courts during the first decade
under the CSRA. The WPA returns us to 1979 when the law of reprisal began its
development.
Fong, supra note 2, at 1062.
18. This Article will use the terms "title 5" and "title 5 employees" to refer to the vast
majority of federal civil service employees who are appointed under the authority of title 5 of
the U.S. Code. The Article will use "title 38" and "title 38 employees" to refer to those
higher level employees employed in various medical occupations of the Department of Veter-
ans Affairs (DVA) who are appointed under the authority of title 38 of the U.S. Code and have
few procedural rights under the provisions of tide 5.
19. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 49 M.S.P.R. 682, 687 (1991) (de-
nying jurisdiction under WPA to hear appeal brought by title 38 physician); accord McKay v.
Veterans Admin., 23 M.S.P.R. 244, 245-46 (1984) (reconsidering and holding that MSPB
lacks jurisdiction to hear pre-WPA whistleblower appeal by nurse appointed under title 38);
Gilbert v. Veterans Admin., 14 M.S.P.R. 152, 153-54 (1982) (concluding that physician ap-
pointed under title 38 had no right of appeal to MSPB under pre-WPA whistleblower provi-
sions of title 5).
20. 49 M.S.P.R. 682 (1991).
21. See Alvarez v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 49 M.S.P.R. 682, 685 (1991) (holding
that WPA does not modify or supplement title 38 appeals process for adverse personnel ac-
tions taken by DVA); see also 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7421, 7422, 7425 (West 1991) (assigning power to
determine personnel system practices and procedures of DVA's physicians to Secretary of
Department).
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system allows the MSPB to grant a stay at the request of the Office
of Special Counsel (OSC) pending a full investigation into a pro-
posed adverse action based on a title 38 employee's whistleblowing,
despite the fact that the Board is precluded from hearing an appeal
on the merits of such an action involving a title 38 employee.22
In Alvarez, a title 38 physician alleged that his reassignment and
proposed removal were consequences of his whistleblowing activi-
ties.23 The physician brought an Individual Right of Action (IRA)
appeal to the Board, which an AJ dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. 24
Curiously, the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) conceded lim-
ited jurisdiction to the Board to review the whistleblowing allega-
tions.25 The Board rejected this overture, however, holding that the
AJ did not err in dismissing the appeal and that employees ap-
pointed under 38 U.S.C. § 4104(1)26 are not covered by the provi-
sions of the WPA.27 The Board noted that no indications existed in
the WPA's legislative history that Congress intended to "broaden
the universe" of employees who are protected from whistleblower
reprisal beyond those protected under title 5.28
22. See Special Counsel v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 45 M.S.P.R. 41, 42-43 (1990)
(granting stay of termination on behalf of Veteran's Administration medical employee). It is
curious, given the MSPB's reputation for expedient resolution of disputes, see 1991 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (presenting statistics that underscore Board's emphasis on effi-
ciency, both in its own operations and in operation of federal personnel merit systems), that
under the WPA the OSC would be allowed (1) to expend the time, money, and effort of a full
investigation into allegations of an adverse action based on a title 38 appointee's whistleblow-
ing, and (2) to expend further time and effort to request a stay of the adverse action from the
Board, only to find that at the end of the temporary stay period the DVA could continue
pursuing the adverse action to its conclusion without fear of an appeal of such action under
the WPA where corrective action might be ordered.
23. Alvarez, 49 M.S.P.R. at 683.
24. Id. at 684.
25. Id
26. See 38 U.S.C. § 4104(1) (1988) (providing for appointment of physicians, dentists,
podiatrists, optometrists, nurses, physician assistants, and expanded-function dental
auxiliaries).
27. Alvarez, 49 M.S.P.R. at 685. Despite the fact that nothing in the WPA suggests that
DVA employees are exempt from the WPA's provisions, the Board reasoned:
[The WPA's provisions apply] in light of Section 4119, which requires that other,
inconsistent law must "specifically provide[ ]" for a new provision to supersede,
override, or modify the Title 38 scheme. It would clearly be "inconsistent" for the
Board to adjudicate personnel matters independently of the DMS [(Department of
Medicine and Surgery)] scheme, perhaps ordering alternative corrective action based
on the more stringent civil service requirements that Congress sought to avoid.
Id.; see also Davis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 49 M.S.P.R. 679, 681 (1991) (holding that
WPA does not cover nurses appointed under § 4104(1) because such employees are instead
subject to less protective internal disciplinary rules of Department of Medicine and Surgery of
DVA).
28. Alvarez, 49 M.S.P.R. at 686. The Board refused to extend title 5 protections to title
38 employees under the WPA in the absence of specific congressional direction to bring about
such a result. Id. at 686 nn.5 & 6.
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In Chan v. Department of Veterans Affairs,29 the Board heard the com-
pliance appeal of a part-time physician appointed to his position in
the DVA under 38 U.S.C. § 4114(a)(1)(A).3 0 The physician filed an
IRA appeal of his termination, which he claimed was retaliation for
whistleblowing.3 1 The parties reached a settlement agreement, but
Dr. Chan later filed a petition for enforcement of the agreement
when the agency allegedly did not comply with the agreement re-
garding the dissemination of peer review information.3 2 The AJ
concluded that he could not enforce the agreement due to a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.33 On appeal the Board found that, be-
cause the WPA makes no specific provision for the MSPB to adjudi-
cate personnel matters independent of a DVA hospital's disciplinary
scheme, employees appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 4114(a)(1)(A) are
not protected under title 5 from whistleblower reprisal.3 4 The
Board recognized that title 38 had been amended recently, but did
not apply the new statutory language to the facts of the Chan
appeal. 35
29. 53 M.S.P.R. 617 (1992).
30. Chan v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 53 M.S.P.R. 617, 620 (1992). Congress
repealed and reenacted in modified form the provision under which the appellant had re-
ceived his appointment. See Department of Veterans Affairs Health-Care Personnel Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-40, § 401, 105 Stat. 187, 221 (codified at 38 U.S.C.A. § 7405 (West
1991)) [hereinafter DVA Health-Care Personnel Act]. Before the repeal and reenactment of§ 4114 as § 7405, the Act had been interpreted to mean that civil service procedural protec-
tions did not apply to part-time physicians employed by the DVA. See Orloff v. Cleland, 708
F.2d 372, 376-77 (9th Cir. 1983) (reviewing legislative history of DVA Health-Care Personnel
Act and personnel practices of DVA to find that part-time employees' appointments under
§ 4114 receive no protection).
31. Chan, 53 M.S.P.R. at 619.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Chan, 53 M.S.P.R. at 620 (applying legal reasoning from Alvarez v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 49 M.S.P.R. 682, 685 (1991) (declining to adjudicate personnel matters in-
dependently from Department of Medicine and Surgery scheme)).
35. See id. at 620 n.3 (noting existence of changes in title 38 but finding such changes
inapplicable to facts of case). It is important to note that, although the provisions of 38 U.S.C.
§ 4119 (1988) were basically reproduced in the new § 7425, a subtle change in the language
of § 7425 distinguishes its coverage from that of former § 4119. Section 4119 stated:
[N]o provision of title 5 or any other law pertaining to the civil service system which
is inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter shall be considered to super-
sede, override, or otherwise modify such provision of this subchapter except to the
extent that such provision of title 5 or such other law specifically provides, by the
specific reference to a provision of this subchapter, for such provision to be super-
seded, overriden, or otherwise modified.
38 U.S.C. § 4119 (1988). Section 7425(b) states:
[N]o provision of title 5 or any other law pertaining to the civil service system which
is inconsistent with any provision of section 7306 of this title or this chapter shall be con-
sidered to supercede, override, or otherwise modify such provision of that section or
this chapter except to the extent that such provision of title 5 or of such other law
specifically provides, by specific reference to a provision of this chapter, [f] or such pro-
vision to be superceded, overriden, or otherwise modified.
38 U.S.C.A. § 7425(b) (West 1991) (emphasis added). This subtle change in the language
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2. Title 38 amendments: Improving DVA recruitment and retention
When Congress recently undertook the revision of title 38, it was
acutely aware that the less than ideal employment conditions of DVA
medical personnel contributed to relatively high turnover rates and
difficulties in replacing medical personnel lost through attrition.3 6
To address this crisis, the Senate specifically intended that certain
rights of title 5 employees be applied to title 38 employees with re-
gard to hours and conditions of employment.3 7 Congress expressly
provided these rights in the Department of Veterans Affairs Health-
Care Personnel Act of 1991. 38 The provisions of this statute still
restrict the prescription of hours, conditions of employment, and
leaves of absence for title 38 appointees by vesting exclusive author-
ity over such items in the Secretary of the DVA. 3 9 Under the title 38
amendments, however, chapter 74 employees may engage in collec-
tive bargaining with regard to conditions of employment40 not in-
volving "professional conduct or competence," "peer review," or
"the establishment, determination, or adjustment" of title 38 em-
ployee compensation. 41 Matters not pertaining to any of these three
categories are now subject to collective bargaining and presumably
becomes important when viewing the new § 7425 in light of the other new provisions of this
chapter of title 38. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7421-7423 (West 1991) (providing, in § 7421, author-
ity for Veterans Administration Secretary to prescribe personnel regulations while limiting, in
§ 7422, Secretary's authority to interfere with employees' right of collective bargaining and
defining in § 7423 hours of employment and obligations of full-time employees under title
38).
36. See H.R. REP. No. 466, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990) (discussing proposed amend-
ments to title 38 to improve medical personnel retention and patient care in hospitals man-
aged by DVA). The House Report referred to a "crisis" in the veterans' health care system:
The ... crisis is prospective in nature, reflected by findings about turnover rates,
increasing delays in filling vacancies and decreasing qualifications of new hires....
[A]nalysis of turnover rates among DVA physicians reveals that retention beyond
four years of service is problematic. For example, the turnover rate for physicians
under 35 years of age with two to four years of DVA experience was 22 percent in
1987, a level that results in high administrative costs and, more importantly, that
results in threats to the continuity of patient care.
Id.
37. See S. REP. No. 379, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1990) (seeking to apply labor-manage-
ment rights under chapter 71 of title 5, which include general employee rights to organize,
bargain collectively, and participate in labor organizations, to title 38 employees).
38. Pub. L. No. 102-40, 105 Stat. 187 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.A.
(West 1991)).
39. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7421(a) (West 1991).
40. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7422 (West 1991) (restricting authority of DVA Secretary to pre-
scribe regulations under § 7422 in conjunction with collective bargaining provisions of chap-
ter 71 of title 5). Chapter 74 of tite 38 permits the Veterans Health Administration, the
former Department of Medicine and Surgery, to appoint its own employees. 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 7401 (West 1991). This chapter also provides for collective bargaining rights and special
pay for certain classes of employees. Id. §§ 7422, 7431-7438.
41. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7422 (West 1991).
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to review by external entities.42
The argument thus arises that the 1991 amendments manifest
Congress' desire to afford title 38 medical personnel more protec-
tive employment rights to address problems in recruitment and re-
tention among this vital personnel group.43 Therefore, it should no
longer be considered "inconsistent" with title 38 or chapter 7444 for
personnel decisions not concerning professional conduct or compe-
tence, peer review, or employee compensation to be reviewed by an
external entity or agency, including the MSPB.45
B. Interim Relief and Unbridled Agency Discretion
The WPA made interim relief available to appellants who prevail
between the date of an initial agency decision and the date that the
full Board issues a final decision in any case before the MSPB.46
42. This conclusion is negatively implied by the following statutory pronouncement,
which delineates specific issues that remain exempt from detached scrutiny:
An issue of whether a matter or question concerns or arises out of (1) professional
conduct or competence, (2) peer review, or (3) the establishment, determination or
adjustment of employee compensation under this title shall be decided by the Secre-
tary and is not itself subject to collective bargaining and may not be reviewed by any
other agency.
38 U.S.C.A. § 7422(d) (West 1991).
43. The legislative process toward passage of the DVA Health-Care Personnel Act began
in 1987. An early concern, expressed in the introduction of S. 9, the Omnibus Veterans'
Benefits and Services Act of 1987, addressed the high turnover of medical employees. See S.
REP. No. 215, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 141-45 (1987) (reporting that Senate sought to create
hybrid title 38-title 5 medical employees in order to make medical personnel salaries more
competitive and to dissuade high turnover rates). Such hybrid employees should receive the
same protection under the law in matters concerning adverse personnel actions, disciplinary
actions, and grievance procedures as that received by employees appointed under title 5. Id.
44. Chapter 74 of title 38 provides for the hiring and personnel rights of DVA medical
employees. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7464 (West 1991). This chapter was included in the DVA
Health-Care Personnel Act to specifically give these employees the same protections provided
to title 5 employees of other governmental agencies. See supra notes 37, 43 and accompanying
text (citing Senate report expressing congressional intent that hybrid employees receive same
legal protections as title 5 employees); see also supra note 35 (discussing specific amendment to
title 38 to provide title 5 protections to title 38 employees).
45. Such an approach would be in line with the Board's own findings regarding the title
38 personnel system. In 1991, the MSPB initiated a special study of the title 38 personnel
system and arrived at some interesting conclusions. See U.S. MERIT SYs. PROTECTION BD., THE
TITLE 38 PERSONNEL SYSTEM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS: AN ALTERNATE AP-
PROACH 1-3 (1991) (examining title 38 personnel system and comparing title 5 system of per-
sonnel review, discipline, and adverse action to that used in title 38). The most notable
finding in the report, for purposes of this Article, is the indication by title 38 personnel that
the title 38 disciplinary process is frustrating, slow, and not subject to neutral, outside review
by the Board. Id. at 43. One medical center director indicated that the title 5 adverse action
system was preferable to the system available under title 38. Id. But see id. at 45-46 (conclud-
ing that market considerations such as shortfall in health care professional labor market serve
to equalize title 5 and title 38 systems of making personnel decisions).
46. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A) (Supp. I1 1991) (authorizing MSPB to order interim
relief to appellants prevailing at "regional office level" between initial decision and final deci-
sion of petition for review); see also Ginocchi v. Department of Treasury, 53 M.S.P.R. 62, 67-68
(1992) (stating that AJ's order of interim relief properly addressed dispute in question and
1993] SURVEY OF MSPB CASES IN 1991-1992 879
Although "interim relief" is a new requirement introduced as part
of the WPA, it applies to all appeals and protects whistleblowers as
well as those employees who prevail but have not raised a specific
defense of whistleblower reprisal. 47 Interim relief refers to the re-
lief specified in an AJ's decision wherein the employee prevails.
Such relief, subject to certain restrictions, may include returning the
employee to his or her former work environment until a final Board
decision has been rendered in the appeal.48 Congress intended the
interim relief provision to benefit the agency and the employee alike
by limiting the waste of human and financial resources that often
accompanies protracted personnel action appeals. 49
The Board's decision in Ginocchi v. Department of Treasury50 was a
case of first impression dealing with the question of whether an
agency is obligated to return an employee to his or her former posi-
tion under an order to provide interim relief.5 1 Under the WPA, an
agency must provide interim relief when ordered unless it deter-
mines that the "return or presence" of the employee would be un-
duly disruptive to the work environment. 52 In Ginocchi, the agency
determined that the employee's return would indeed be unduly dis-
that MSPB would not "look behind" agency determination that returning employee would
not unduly disrupt work environment).
47. See Ginocchi, 53 M.S.P.R. at 66-67 (interpreting language of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)
to permit MSPB to order interim relief for appellants who prevail at regional level, effective
during time period between date of initial decision and date of Board's final decision on ap-
peal). The Board did indicate that interim relief may not be applicable in all cases in which an
employee prevails, but the determination as to the appropriateness of such relief is left to the
AJ. Id. at 67 n.3.
48. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1991) (providing that during time period
pending outcome of petition for review, interim relief comprised of pay, compensation, and
all other benefits provided under terms and conditions of employment may be granted to
employee); id. § 7701(b)(2)(C) (stipulating that no award of back pay or attorneys' fees may be
paid as "interim relief" before final decision is entered).
49. See H. REP. No. 274, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1984) (stating that MSPB AJ
should have authority to grant interim relief to prevent unnecessary waste of human and fi-
nancial resources in situations where employee will ultimately be reinstated); see also Ginocchi,
53 M.S.P.R. at 69 (interpreting interim relief as relief intended by Congress to benefit both
agency and employee by limiting waste of human and financial resources).
50. 53 M.S.P.R. 62 (1992).
51. See Ginocchi v. Department of Treasury, 53 M.S.P.R. 62, 64 (1992) (addressing
nonwhistleblower situation in which employee was notified that he would be demoted to audi-
tor (GS-13) position for failure to perform effectively in his supervisory auditor (GM-14) posi-
tion). The agency contended that the employee's appointment to the supervisory position
was subject to a probationary period, and it consequently afforded him only the limited appeal
rights due a probationary employee. Id. He appealed to the MSPB, and the AJ found that the
employee was not a probationer and that the agency had not accorded him chapter 43 per-
formance appraisal or chapter 75 adverse action procedures, as required under title 5. Id. at
64-65. The AJ ordered the agency to cancel the demotion and provide the employee with
interim relief in accordance with the WPA. Id. at 74 (ordering agency to grant employee back
pay with interest and to provide mechanism to return him to his former supervisory auditor
position).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (Supp. III 1991).
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ruptive to the workplace.53 The Board, however, found that it was
within Congress' intent to allow the agency to place the employee in
a lesser position than the one originally occupied, not only to avoid
disruption, but also to utilize the employee in a productive manner
while awaiting a final Board decision. 54
Two days after Ginocchi established this principle, the Board ruled
on similar facts in Ingram v. Department of Air Force.55 In Ingram, an
employee who had been removed from her position because of ille-
gal drug purchase and possession charges appealed the action to the
Board.56 The AJ mitigated the penalty to a sixty-day suspension and
ordered interim relief, finding that the agency's deciding official had
not given proper consideration to all the circumstances of the
case. 57 The Board, citing Ginocchi, nevertheless held that it would
not question the reasons supporting an agency's determination that
returning an employee to his or her previous position would be un-
duly disruptive to the work environment. 58 The Board riot only ac-
cepted the agency's determination that returning the appellant to
her position on an interim basis would be unduly disruptive, but
also approved the decision to keep the employee in an off-duty sta-
tus.59 The MSPB came to this conclusion because the agency as-
sured the Board that the appellant would receive the pay and
benefits to which she was entitled as a result of the interim relief
order.60
53. Ginocchi, 53 M.S.P.R. at 68-69. The MSPB draws a distinction between the terms
"return," which is used to refer to an employee who is sent back to his or her former position,
and "presence," which refers to an employee being present in the workplace in any capacity at
all. Id.
54. See id. at 69-70 (reasoning that because agency is required to pay and provide full
benefits of original position to employee under interim relief provision, employee may as well
perform some useful function for agency instead of being placed in off-duty status, still receiv-
ing full pay and benefits). The Board noted that it would "hold the agency's decision to
detail, assign, or restrict the duties of an employee for whom interim relief [is] ordered sub-
ject to a 'bad faith' standard of review." Id. at 70.
55. 53 M.S.P.R. 101 (1992).
56. Ingram v. Department of Air Force, 53 M.S.P.R. 101, 103 (1992).
57. Id. at 103. Specifically, the AJ found that: (1) the exact amount of marijuana discov-
ered in the employee's purse was not ascertained, (2) the employee admitted that use of mari-
juana off base was not proper conduct for a government employee, (3) other employees
charged with the same offense and whose charges were sustained were generally not removed,
(4) the agency's explanation for distinguishing blue- and white-collar workers was capricious
and did not justify differing treatment, and (5) the deciding official failed to consider appel-
lant's capacity for rehabilitation in light of her entry into a drug rehabilitation program, her
outstanding job performance, and her remorse. Id.
58. Id. at 104.
59. Id. The agency had decided, in effect, to keep paying the appellant her salary and
providing her all the benefits of her former position, per the interim relief order, while keep-
ing her in an off-duty status where she could provide no benefit whatsoever to the agency
during the interim period. lId
60. Id. Recent Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations interpret the interim
relief provision as requiring an agency, under an order to provide interim relief, to place an
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Thus, both Ingram and Ginocchi hold that "the Board will not look
behind an agency determination that returning an employee to the
position he [or she] encumbered will be unduly disruptive to the
work environment. ' 6' Furthermore, Ingram appears to extend this
MSPB deference to include situations in which an agency forbids an
employee, even on an interim basis, from returning to or being
present in the workplace in a position different from the one he or
she previously held. 62
C. Other Whistleblower Developments
1. Filing EEO complaints not protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
The Board recently focused its attention on the definition of
whistleblowing for the purpose of determining whether an em-
ployee who suffered a retaliatory personnel action upon the filing of
an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint could obtain a
stay of the personnel action. In Williams v. Department of Defense (Wil-
liams f1),63 the Board considered the case of an employee removed
from his position after filing an EEO complaint. 64 The Board held
that such reprisal for filing an EEO complaint constituted a violation
of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) rather than of § 2302(b)(8).65 The Board
stated further that only the latter section is covered by the stay pro-
vision of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(c). 66
employee "in a paid duty status in the same or similar position," unless the agency "deter-
mines that the return or presence of the individual would be unduly disruptive to the work
environment," whereupon the employee may be placed in a "paid non-duty status" during
the pendency of the Board's review. 57 Fed. Reg. 3712, 3713 (1992) (to be codified at 5
C.F.R. § 772.102(d)). Unfortunately, the OPM regulations do not reflect the MSPB's distinc-
tion between "return" and "presence" of the employee in the work environment. See supra
note 53 (explaining MSPB's distinction between two terms). The Board has noted that it is
not bound by the OPM interpretation of the statutory interim relief provisions and that it
alone is the exclusive authority for construing this section of title 5. Ginocchi, 55 M.S.P.R. at
71 n.7.
61. Ingram, 53 M.S.P.R. at 104; Ginocchi, 53 M.S.P.R. at 68.
62. See Ingram, 53 M.S.P.R. at 104 (holding that Board will not "look behind" agency
action informing employee that he or she will be maintained in off-duty status during interim
period and, by implication, extending MSPB deference for agency determinations under un-
duly disruptive analysis).
63. 46 M.S.P.R. 549 (1991).
64. Williams v. Department of Defense (Williams II), 46 M.S.P.R. 549, 553-55 (1991).
65. Id at 554. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (Supp. I 1990) (protecting employees
from reprisal for lawful disclosure of information relating to violations of any laws, rules, or
regulations or relating to mismanagement, waste of funds, abuse of authority, or public health
or safety dangers) with 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) (Supp. 11 1990) (protecting employees from
arbitrary action, retaliation for filing grievances, complaints, or appeals, personal favoritism,
partisan political coercion, or prohibited uses of authority or attempts to influence elections).
66. See Williams I, 46 M.S.P.R. at 554 (holding that Congress intended to limit stays to
specific cases of whistleblower reprisals and that EEO filings protected by 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9) (Supp. I 1990) do not qualify for protection under 5 U.S.C. § 1221(c) (Supp. I
1989)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 122 1(c) (Supp. 11 1990) (providing that any employee, former em-
882 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:869
In subsequent cases, the Board extended its reasoning in Williams
II to deny employees each of the safeguards of the WPA, including
the stay, the clear and convincing evidence standard, and other pro-
cedures, in situations where an employee is the victim of retaliation
for filing a grievance, filing a claim with the Office of Worker's Com-
pensation Programs, or pursuing any similar complaint for personal
relief now included under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) rather than
§ 2302(b)(8). 67 As a result, an increasing number of activities re-
lated to federal employment are not protected specifically by the
WPA, but are left instead to the ordinary, less protective provisions
of title 5.68
2. Prosecuting retaliatory acts by government supervisors
Whistleblower reprisal is not only an employee's affirmative de-
fense to a proposed personnel action, 69 but also may be grounds for
disciplinary action against a supervisor who has engaged in retalia-
tory activities. The WPA contains distinct provisions for processing
"corrective actions," where an employee seeks to halt a personnel
ployee, or applicant for employment seeking individual right of action as result of prohibited
personnel practice may request MSPB to order stay of personnel action).
The Federal Circuit recently examined this question in Spruill v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 978 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1992), where an employee of the DVA appealed a three-day
suspension which, he alleged, resulted from his filing of an EEO complaint. Id. at 681. The
AJ dismissed the case for lack of proper jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (Supp. II
1990) precisely because the employee had filed an EEO complaint. Id. at 682. The Federal
Circuit affirmed the AJ's determination, ruling that a complaint about discriminatory behavior
does not constitute whistleblowing for purposes of the WPA protections afforded in 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8), and that an EEO complaint is best addressed by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) and not the MSPB. Id. at 691-92.
67. See, e.g., Santillan v. Department of Air Force, 53 M.S.P.R. 487, 490-91 (1992) (find-
ing that employee actions of filing EEO complaint to disclose personnel records falsification
and filing Privacy Act request for correction of personnel record are covered under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9), and therefore MSPB does not have jurisdiction to reverse agency's termination
of employee for these actions); Marable v. Department of Army, 52 M.S.P.R. 622, 630 (1992)
(following Williams II by denying WPA protection for employee filing unfair labor practice
EEO complaint and grievance and upholding agency decision to terminate employee for falsi-
fying travel voucher and being absent without leave); Buster v. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs, 52 M.S.P.R. 206, 209-10 (1992) (upholding agency decision to dismiss employee for
fighting by refusing to extend WPA protections to cover employee asserting affirmative de-
fense of removal as reprisal for initiating EEO complaint); Von Kelsch v. Department of La-
bor, 51 M.S.P.R. 378,379-80 (1991) (following Williams IIby denying IRA appeal of employee
claiming that job reassignment resulted as reprisal for her filing of worker':; compensation
claim not arising under § 2302(b)(8)).
68. See Santillan, 53 M.S.P.R. at 491 (averring that legislative history of WPA indicates
intent to refrain from broad protection and noting that protections from reprisal exist under 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) for employees filing grievances, EEO complaints, or appeals, and under 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1988) for employees filing requests to amend personnel records).
69. See 5 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (Supp. 1 1989) (stating that purpose of WPA is to provide
whistleblowers with protection from adverse consequences that may result from coercive per-
sonnel practices used by employers).
1993] SURVEY OF MSPB CASES IN 1991-1992 883
action on the ground that it is retaliatory,70 and "disciplinary ac-
tions," where the OSC brings an action to punish a supervisor who
is alleged to have engaged in reprisal. 71 Corrective actions are
processed under 5 U.S.C. § 1214, while disciplinary actions are
processed under 5 U.S.C. § 1215. Surrounding each of these sec-
tions is a unique body of law.72
In the landmark case of Special Counsel v. Hathaway,73 the MSPB
held that under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), the WPA protected a federal
employee who reported what he believed were improper discontin-
ued service retirements to the Inspector General and the OSC.7 4
The MSPB disciplined the employee's supervisor for engaging in
unlawful reprisal by threatening the employee with an unacceptable
performance rating and removal. 75 The supervisor was so disci-
70. See 5 U.S.C. § 1214 (Supp. 1 1989) (providing mechanism for Special Counsel to
investigate prohibited personnel practices and to issue stays and orders for corrective action
upon finding that agency would not have taken adverse action absent employee's whistleblow-
ing disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)).
71. See 5 U.S.C. § 1215 (Supp. 11989) (providing Special Counsel with authority to take
disciplinary action against any employee who is determined to have committed prohibited
personnel action, violated 5 U.S.C. § 1216, or refused to comply with order of MSPB). Sec-
tion 1216 provides OSC withjurisdiction to investigate prohibited political activities, arbitrary
or capricious withholdings of information, any activities prohibited by any civil service law,
rule, or regulation, or involvement by any employee in prohibited discrimination. 5 U.S.C.
§ 1216 (Supp. 1 1989). The section prevents OSC from investigating allegations that could
more appropriately be resolved under administrative appeals processes. Id.
72. An agency defending its actions under § 1214 may raise an affirmative defense to an
employee's showing that his or her whistleblowing was a contributing factor leading to the
agency's personnel action. Under that affirmative defense, the agency will be exonerated if it
can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel action
regardless of the employee's alleged whistleblowing. The "contributing factor" standard of
causation is derived from the explicit language of the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(4)(B)(i)
(Supp. I 1989). The "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof is also derived from
the explicit language of the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(4)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1 1989).
For a supervisor defending against disciplinary action under § 1215, however, it remains
unclear whether such an affirmative defense exists that would permit the alleged retaliator to
show that the employee's whistleblowing was not a "significant factor" in the supervisor's
proposing the personnel action. See Starret v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1253 n.12 (4th
Cir. 1986) (declining to address whether "significant factor" test for causation adopted in Mt.
Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), should be applied in case not
involving retaliation for constitutionally protected conduct). The "significant factor" stan-
dard of causation is not found in the language of § 1215, and neither is any affirmative de-
fense. See 5 U.S.C. § 1215 (Supp. 1 1989) (failing to supply affirmative defenses or assign
burden of proo).
Without allowing supervisors to use an affirmative defense, the Board may occasionally
achieve the anomalous result of simultaneously refusing to protect a whistleblower from re-
prisal under § 1214, while refusing to protect his or her supervisor from discipline under
§ 1215. Thus, both the whistleblower and the alleged retaliator could potentially lose their
bids for protection.
73. 49 M.S.P.R. 595 (1991).
74. See Special Counsel v. Hathaway, 49 M.S.P.R. 595, 611-12 (1991) (finding that em-
ployee's revelation of improper discontinued service retirements to IG constituted protected
whistleblowing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). Hathaway was the first complaint for discipli-
nary action filed by the OSC after enactment of the WPA.
75. See id. at 613 (finding that supervisor's reprisal against whistleblower constituted seri-
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plined because he could not prove, under the "contributing factor"
test therein adopted by the Board,7 6 that he would have taken the
same adverse actions in the absence of the employee's protected
disclosures.77
Similarly, in Special Counsel v. Eidmann,78 the Board found by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that an employee's whistleblowing was a
contributing factor in precipitating an adverse personnel action
against that employee.7 9 Because the employee's supervisor could
not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he would
have taken the action in the absence of the disclosures, s ° the Board
upheld an AJ's recommended sanction of the supervisor.8 1 On ap-
peal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court
significantly altered the standard for imposing disciplinary sanctions
under 5 U.S.C. § 1215 by requiring that the "whistleblowing activity
be a 'significant factor' in the reprisal action."'8 2 The court reasoned
that Congress declined to change the Board's previously adopted
causal standard when it codified that contributing factor standard in
§ 1214 but left § 1215 intact in the WPA amendments to title 5.83
Despite the Board's error in applying the contributing factor rather
ous violation with adverse impact on agency's reputation and ordering supervisor suspended
for 30 days).
76. See supra note 72 (explaining "contributing factor" test established in 5 U.S.C.
§ 1214(b)(4)(B)(i)).
77. See Hathaway, 49 M.S.P.R. at 601, 610 (using, inappropriately, same evidentiary stan-
dard in disciplinary action case as in corrective action cases to find that whistleblower reprisal
can be shown by preponderance of evidence as contributing factor in adverse action). But cf
Eidmann v. MSPB, 976 F.2d 1400, 1404-06 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (adopting higher standard for
showing validity of disciplinary action under § 1215 than standard for showing validity of
corrective action under § 1214 because disciplinary actions are punitive in nature and thus
merit more stringent standard of proof).
78. 49 M.S.P.R. 614 (1991), aft'd, Eidmann v. MSPB, 976 F.2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
79. See Special Counsel v. Eidmann, 49 M.S.P.R. 614, 626 (1991) (holding that OSC met
"contributing factor" test and thus found violation of WPA by showing that less than one
month separated employee's disclosures and his receipt of termination notice from agency),
aff'd, Eidmann v. MSPB, 976 F.2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The employee had written letters to
the agency's health and safety officer alleging violations of an agency smoking regulation and
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 617-18. His supervisor recommended
his termination, despite the fact that his performance was fully satisfactory, after the employee
informed the supervisor that he had taken his complaints outside the office. Id. at 616-19, 622
(concluding that employee's conduct constituted whistleblowing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
for agency's violation of federal smoking regulations).
80. Id at 626-27.
81. Id at 628 (adopting AJ's recommendation of two-grade demotion of supervisor to
nonsupervisory position for two years as appropriate penalty because seriousness of supervi-
sor's retaliation against employee for making protected disclosures demanded "severe"
sanction).
82. Eidmann v. MSPB, 976 F.2d 1400, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 1405. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(4)(B) (Supp. III 1991) (requiring that OSC
demonstrate that whistleblowing is contributing factor in adverse personnel action before
Board will order corrective action) with 5 U.S.C. § 1215 (Supp. III 1991) (providing no spe-
cific standard for use by Board to find that employee deserves disciplinary action).
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than significant factor test under § 1215, the court stated that "the
Board found sufficient facts to permit this court to affirm its
judgment."8 4
3. The nexus requirement
Under reprisal law prior to the WPA, an employee claiming to be
aggrieved because of whistleblowing activities had to establish a
causal connection or "nexus" between his or her protected conduct
and the agency's personnel action.8 5 An early MSPB decision under
the WPA held that, for the purpose of determining agency liability,
an employee alleging agency retaliation need only show "closeness
in time" between his or her protected disclosures and a subsequent
adverse agency action to establish the required nexus between the
two events.8 6 In more recent cases, the Board has held that the
nexus requirement still exists under the WPA, although the deci-
sions suggest that the requirement has become somewhat
attenuated.
For example, in the recent case of Wagner v. EPA,87 an employee
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) filed an IRA ap-
peal under the WPA to contest adverse actions taken by EPA re-
garding his job performance.8 8 On appeal to the MSPB, the
employee argued that the Board's decision in Williams v. Department
84. Eidmann, 976 F.2d at 1408.
85. See, e.g., Haine v. Department of Navy, 41 M.S.P.R. 462, 472-73 (1989) (establishing
that employee can demonstrate existence of agency reprisal by showing that employee made
protected disclosure, accused official knew of disclosure, adverse action could have been retal-
iation, and genuine nexus existed between agency's adverse action, appellant's protected dis-
closure, and deciding official's motive for taking adverse action); Cooney v. Department of Air
Force, 37 M.S.P.R. 240, 242 (1988) (requiring that employee show causal nexus between em-
ployee's protected activity, adverse action, and superior's motive for taking adverse action);
Oliver v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 34 M.S.P.R. 465, 469-70 (1987) (requiring
that showing of agency reprisal entails demonstrating nexus between protected disclosure,
knowledge of disclosure by official, adverse action by official, and official's motive for taking
adverse action).
86. See Gergick v. General Servs. Admin., 43 M.S.P.R. 651, 661-62 (1990) (finding em-
ployee's demonstration of connection between time he made protected disclosures and time
agency took adverse personnel action to be sufficient proof that whistleblowing was contribut-
ing factor to adverse action).
87. 51 M.S.P.R. 337 (1991), af'd, 972 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
88. Wagner v. EPA, 51 M.S.P.R. 337, 340 (1991), aft'd, 972 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
The employee argued that his disclosures to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the General
Accounting Office, and the agency's Inspector General alleging the misconduct of senior
agency Inspector General officials caused his supervisor to reduce his performance rating. Id.
at 340. The AJ determined that the officials involved in the preparation of the employee's
performance evaluation were aware of his disclosures when they prepared the appraisal. Id
Evidence showed that the employee's supervisors knew that he had made disclosures on Octo-
ber 18 and October 26, 1989, and other evidence indicated that his performance appraisal
was prepared in November 1989. IM. at 341. The AJ nevertheless determined that this tem-
poral sequence was not circumstantial evidence of a causal connection because the employee's
performance appraisal period technically ended on September 30, 1989. Id. The AJ there-
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of Defense (Williams 1)89 struck down the requirement that an appel-
lant must demonstrate a nexus between his or her protected con-
duct and an agency's personnel action.90 The MSPB found no merit
in this contention, noting that its holding in Williams I was limited to
the replacement of the old substantial factor test with the contribut-
ing factor test.9 1
In a second recent case, Thompson v. Farm Credit Administration,92
the Board allowed circumstantial evidence alone to establish the re-
quired nexus. In Thompson, the agency removed an employee for
unacceptable performance in a critical element of his position after a
designated performance improvement period had elapsed.93 De-
spite the employee's demonstrated substandard perforn-ance dur-
ing that period, an AJ reversed the agency's decision to remove him
because the adverse action was initiated in reprisal for the em-
ployee's whistleblowing activities. 94 The Board agreed with the AJ,
finding that circumstantial evidence provided the required nexus
between the employee's protected activity and the agency's person-
nel action.95
In a third recent case, Duda v. Department of Veterans Affairs,9 6 the
Board addressed the novel issue of whether the WPA prohibits an
agency from taking a personnel action against an employee because
of his or her relationship with another employee who has made pro-
tected disclosures. 97 The Board held that retaliation against one
fore found that the employee failed to show by direct or circumstantial evidence that his dis-
closures were a contributing factor in his performance evaluation. Id. at 341-42.
89. 45 M.S.P.R. 146 (1990), rev'd, Williams v. Department of Defense (Williams II), 46
M.S.P.R. 549 (1991).
90. Wagner, 51 M.S.P.R. at 345.
91. Id.
92. 51 M.S.P.R. 569 (1991).
93. Thompson v. Farm Credit Admin., 51 M.S.P.R. 569, 574 (1991).
94. lId at 574-75. The employee's protected disclosures consisted of certain discussions
with the Farm Credit Administration's chairperson and other officials in which the employee
urged, contrary to the chairperson's wishes, that damaging information be divulged to Con-
gress. Id at 575. The damaging information had been generated by a task force, of which the
employee was a member, that had prepared less-than-rosy financial projections for the Farm
Credit System. Id The AJ found that the employee reasonably believed that withholding this
important financial information from Congress constituted mismanagement or abuse of au-
thority and thus qualified as a protected disclosure under the WPA. Id. The AJ also found
that even though the chairperson did not participate in the performance appraisal process,
and even though the employee's recommendations may not have been intended as any of the
classic whistleblowing disclosures of waste, fraud, or abuse, the agency nevertheless perceived
the employee as a whistleblower and treated him negatively as a result. Id. at 583-84.
95. See id at 584 (characterizing AJ's decision as "informed and reasoned" and agreeing
with AJ's findings that intensity of agency's motive to retaliate outweighed inadequacy of per-
formance of employee's duties).
96. 51 M.S.P.R. 444 (1991).
97. Duda v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 51 M.S.P.R. 444, 445 (1991). The com-
plaining employee in Duda was terminated during his probationary period as a file clerk at the
DVA. Id. Both the employee and his fiancee worked for the DVA, and the employee alleged
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employee because of another employee's whistleblowing falls within
the plain language of the statutory prohibition and is consistent with
the legislative intent and the construction of similar statutes. 98
The divergent outcomes in the three nexus cases discussed above
are difficult to reconcile. In Thompson, the MSPB found a nexus be-
tween an employee's conduct and an agency's personnel action even
where the employee was not a true whistleblower, but was only per-
ceived by the agency to be a whistleblower.99 Furthermore, in Duda
the Board reversed the dismissal of an employee's appeal where the
employee's fiancee, and not the employee himself, engaged in
whistleblowing activity for which the employee claimed he suffered
retaliation.100 Yet in Wagner, the Board found no direct or circum-
stantial evidence of the required nexus where the employee's super-
visors knew of his disclosures several weeks prior to the completion
of his performance appraisal.' 0 ' Given the apparent inconsistency
in these three decisions, it can be argued that the nexus require-
ment, although expressly retained by the Board in Wagner,'0 2 is a
requirement whose meaning has become attenuated through
nonuniform application.'0 3
that his disclosures to a U.S. Senator regarding his supervisor's improper actions, along with
his fiancee's whistleblowing activities concerning the same official, caused his termination. Id.
In his IRA appeal, the employee withdrew the allegation of his own whistleblowing because
his disclosures occurred after he received his notice of termination. Id As a result, the AJ
dismissed the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction, noting that under the Board's regulations imple-
menting the WPA, jurisdiction over IRA appeals is limited to personnel actions taken because
of the appellant's whistleblowing activities. Id. at 444-45.
98. d at 447.
99. Thompson v. Farm Credit Admin., 51 M.S.P.R. 569, 582 (1991).
100. See Duda, 51 M.S.P.R. at 447 (holding that failure to protect employee from retalia-
tion based on relationship with whistleblower could result in thwarting of protected disclo-
sures). In Duda, the key question involved the range of conduct the employee could assert as
conduct causally connected with the personnel action, where the employee conceded that he
had "blown the whistle" after receiving his notice of termination. See Id. at 445 (determining
existence of causal relationship based on particular facts of case). Although the Board in Duda
did not directly consider the nexus question, nexus is a consideration inherent to reprisal
analysis under the WPA that the AJ will presumably have to confront on remand. Cf., e.g.,
Thompson, 51 M.S.P.R. at 580 (noting appellant's burden to establish presence of reprisal).
The Board in Thompson stated that an appellant must establish the existence of reprisal by
showing through a preponderance of evidence standard that "(A) A protected disclosure was
made; (B) the accused official knew of the disclosure; (C) the adverse action under review
could, under the circumstances, have been retaliation; and (D) there was a genuine nexus
between the retaliation and the removal." Id. (citing Warren v. Department of Army, 804
F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
101. Wagner v. EPA, 51 M.S.P.R. 337, 346 (1991), af'd, 972 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
102. Id at 347 (stating that "the requirement to show nexus in order to prove
whistleblower retaliation was not abolished by the enactment of the WPA").
103. A possible explanation for the discrepancy involves the legislative history of the
WPA, which may be interpreted as providing that where alleged whistleblowing and alleged
reprisal occur closely together in time, the law will presume that whistleblowing was a contrib-
uting factor in the agency's personnel decision. See, e.g., Gergick v. General Servs. Admin., 43
M.S.P.R. 651, 661 (1990) (interpreting legislative history of WPA to find that whistleblowing
must be presumed to be contributing factor in agencies' personnel decisions in cases where
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4. The constructive knowledge rule
Beyond requiring a nexus between the protected activity and the
agency action, the test for a prima facie reprisal case also includes
the requirement that the accused official have "knowledge" of the
employee's disclosures. 104 The MSPB decisions have required vary-
ing degrees of actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the
supervisor, at times giving weight to the supervisor's denial of
knowledge' 0 5 and sometimes relying on the closeness in time be-
tween the disclosures and the adverse action to infer such knowl-
edge.10 6 Whether the supervisor knew that the disclosures were of
the variety actually protected under the law, however, is not consid-
ered relevant.' 0 7
whistleblowers' actions and alleged agency reprisals occur proximately in time). More recent
cases, however, adopt such a presumption only under circumstances in which the alleged vic-
tim of retaliation suffers detrimental harm. See, e.g., Thompson, 51 M.S.P.R. at 582 (noting
employee's detriment as rationale for adopting presumption); Duda, 51 M.S.P.R. at 447 (find-
ing employee subject to negative consequences). On the other hand, where the alleged victim
merely receives a "fully successful"job performance rating, as in Wagner, closeness in time to
an alleged whistleblowing event does not give rise to a presumption of nexus. Wagner, 51
M.S.P.R. at 346.
104. Warren v. Department of Army, 804 F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
105. See Newberry v. United States Postal Serv., 49 M.S.P.R. 348, 354 (1991) (finding that
employee did not show that his employer had actual or even constructive knowledge of em-
ployee's filing of EEO complaints and grievances or of his whistleblowing activities, and there-
fore sustaining agency's adverse personnel action against employee). The AJ made this
finding despite circumstantial evidence showing that the employee identified himself in all but
one instance while engaged in whistleblowing activities. Id at 355. The AJ and the MSPB
discounted this evidence by relying on the supervisor's testimony that he did not consider the
employee's conversations with him as constituting whistleblowing. Id.
Similarly, in Rychen v. Department of Army, an Army employee brought an IRA appeal, show-
ing by circumstantial evidence that the supervisors who proposed and approved the agency's
adverse personnel action against her knew of her protected disclosures. Rychen v. Depart-
ment of Army, 51 M.S.P.R. 179, 183-84 (1991). The closeness in time of the disclosures and
the adverse action led to an inference of impropriety and showed the employee's disclosures
to be a factor in the decision to suspend her. Id. at 183. The agency was able to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, however, that the employee's suspension stemmed from her
own misconduct and that it would have imposed the suspension even in the absence of the
employee's disclosures. Id at 184. For example, the agency supplied evidence that the em-
ployee received prior counseling for disruptive and unprofessional conduct, received written
reprimands for unacceptable behavior, and was caught using agency property for personal
business. Id
106. See McClellan v. Department of Defense, 53 M.S.P.R. 139, 142 (1992) (ruling that
agency possessed constructive knowledge of employee's whistleblowing). McClellan involved
an employee who brought an IRA appeal based on his disclosures to a U.S. Representative
regarding fraud and waste in his agency and the retaliatory nature of his assigned military
detail. Id at 140. In the initial decision, an AJ found that the agency's constructive knowl-
edge of the employee's disclosures could be inferred from the closeness in time between the
disclosures and the agency's adverse action, and from the deciding official's lack of credibility.
Id at 143. The Board affirmed, dismissing the agency's argument that the employee did not
prove that anyone with actual knowledge of his disclosures influenced the deciding official.
Id at 145.
107. See Eidmann v. MSPB, 976 F.2d 1400, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that WPA says
nothing about any inquiry into whether supervisor knew of protected nature of employee's
SURVEY OF MSPB CASES IN 1991-1992
II. ADVERSE ACTION CASES
The MSPB decisions discussed in this section highlight Board re-
view of adverse personnel actions taken by federal agencies. As
noted above, the likelihood of an agency having its personnel deci-
sions overturned on review is small.' 0 8 Yet the practitioner repre-
senting an appellant can use the principles in the following cases not
only at the hearing level, but also in prehearing proceedings and
negotiations to avoid what otherwise might lead to a Board affirm-
ance of the agency's action. Note that performance cases and mis-
conduct cases are treated under separate provisions of title 5 of the
United States Code.10 9 The two types of cases have different proce-
dures, entail different forms of analysis, and require that the agency
prove its case under different burdens of proof.
A. Performance Cases: Progeny of Eibel v. Department of Navy
Where an adverse action is proposed under chapter 43 of title 5
due to an employee's unacceptable performance, the employee
must be given an opportunity to improve his or her performance,
and the agency must then prove unacceptable performance by "sub-
stantial evidence." ' "i 0 As a practical matter, where alleged unaccept-
able performance is challenged by an employee in an appeal, an AJ
must determine the validity of the standards themselves before he
or she may consider whether the employee's performance met the
standards in question. 1"' Thus, it is important to note the develop-
ment of MSPB law regarding the minimum statutory requirements
for an agency performance appraisal system.
disclosures). But see Harvey v. MSPB, 802 F.2d 537, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (suggesting that
OSC must prove that supervisor knew of protected nature of employee's disclosures).
108. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing percentages of agency actions
upheld on appeal at Board and court of appeals levels, seemingly based on judicial deference
to agency interpretation of law).
109. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4315 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (setting forth procedures under
chapter 43 for performance-based adverse personnel actions); id. §§ 7501-7543 (setting forth
procedures under chapter 75 for misconduct-based adverse personnel actions). Only poor
performance that can be shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, to impair the "efficiency
of the service" can lead to removal under chapter 75 procedures. See Lovshin v. Department
of Navy, 767 F.2d 826, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing removal pursuant to employee mis-
conduct), cert. denied, 475 U.S. I 111 (1986).
110. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(1) (1991) (defining "substantial evidence" burden in per-
formance case context as something less than preponderance of evidence standard). This
burden of proof is minimal, and the agency's decision will be upheld on appeal as long as
some evidence exists that would permit a reasonable person to reach the conclusion the
agency reached, based on the record as a whole. Id. By contrast, in misconduct cases the
agency must prove misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that it is more
likely than not that each element of the misconduct occurred. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2)
(1991).
111. See Eibel v. Department of Navy, 857 F.2d 1439, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing
AJ's duties in cases involving performance evaluations).
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Eibel v. Department of Navy 112 is a seminal case in this area, standing
for the proposition that performance standards must set forth in ob-
jective terms the minimum level of performance that an employee
must achieve to avoid a performance-based adverse personnel ac-
tion. 113 Such standards must, to the maximum extent feasible, per-
mit the accurate evaluation of job performance.' 1 4 Further,
agencies may not draft "backward" standards that describe unac-
ceptable performance rather than acceptable performance.' 1 5 The
Federal Circuit invalidated the performance standards in Eibel be-
cause the standards were susceptible to various interpretations, did
not permit accurate measurement of performance, were not effec-
tively communicated to employees, and were not capable of clarifi-
cation short of total redrafting.' 16
More recent development of these principles by the MSPB indi-
cates that otherwise inadequate standards can be augmented or clar-
ified, and thus "saved," by supplemental written or oral materials or
instructions that give "content" to the standards and are communi-
cated to employees. For example, in O'Neal v. Department of Army, 17
the Board ruled that an agency may give content to performance
standards by informing employees of specific work requirements
through written instructions, information concerning deficiencies
and methods of improving performance, memoranda describing un-
acceptable performance, and responses to employees' specific ques-
tions concerning performance." 8 The MSPB, however, found the
112. 857 F.2d 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
113. See Eibel, 857 F.2d at 1444 (requiring publication of employee performance standards
and supporting requirement by citing Wilson v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 770
F.2d 1048, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1985), which explains general need for employee-accessible listing
of required performance criteria).
114. See id. at 1441 (citing need for objective evaluation criteria).
115. lId at 1441-42.
116. Id at 1443. The performance standards at issue in Eibel were as follows:
CRITICAL ELEMENT: ENERGY AWARENESS. ** Highly Satisfactory Standard: Co-
ordinate and develop agenda for annual Energy Awareness Week. Initiate and write
twelve or more energy conservation articles for the Marine Corps Development and
Education Command base newspaper, without assistance, to be approved by the su-
pervisor. ** Marginal Standard: No agenda for annual Energy Awareness Week is
developed. No more than six energy conservation articles for the Marine Corps De-
velopment and Education Command base newspaper. Major assistance ig required
at least 50% of the time to complete articles.
CRITICAL ELEMENT: COMMUNICATE WRITTEN AND ORALLY. ** Highly
Satisfactory Standard: Ability to communicate both orally and in written correspon-
dence with military personnel, engineers, planners, technicians, and public officials
without any difficulty. ** Marginal Standard: Requires assistance at least 50% of the
time when communicating in written and oral correspondence with military person-
nel, engineers, planners, technicians, and public officials.
Id at 1440.
117. 47 M.S.P.R. 433 (1991).
118. O'Neal v. Department of Army, 47 M.S.P.R. 433, 440 (1991).
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standards at issue in O'Neal insufficiently objective to apprise the
complaining employee of the standard against which her perform-
ance was to be measured, and found further that the employee's su-
pervisor was unable to articulate the quantitative boundary between
acceptable and unacceptable performance.11 9 Similarly, in Chaggaris
v. General Services Administration,120 an employee attacked an agency's
standards as "absolute," arguing that they provided for no accepta-
ble performance short of perfection. However, the MSPB upheld
the standards as reasonable, especially in light of the fact that the
agency supplied its employees with additional written information
explaining the standards. 121
Where standards are so vague or ambiguous as to require redraft-
ing, they will be held invalid to the benefit of the employee-appel-
lant. In Smith v. Department of Energy, 122 the MSPB reversed an
employee's demotion where the standard for "unacceptable" per-
formance was defined as performance that failed to meet the level of
"marginal" performance, and "marginal" in turn was defined as an
employee "sometimes" having difficulty communicating.1 23 The
Board held that the word "sometimes" is too vague to be helpful in
measuring performance without the addition of interpretive or sup-
plemental instructions. 124 A different result obtained in Sherrell v.
Department of Air Force.125 In that case, an employee challenged the
Air Force's performance standards for their failure to delineate a
range of acceptable levels of performance and to identify marginal
performance. 126 The MSPB upheld the standards, however, despite
the fact that they contained only a three-level rating system and
lacked any performance standard other than one labeled "fully
successful." 127
B. Misconduct Cases
The following discussion highlights recent developments of inter-
119. Id. at 441.
120. 49 M.S.P.R. 249 (1991).
121. See Chaggaris v. General Servs. Admin., 49 M.S.P.R. 249, 252 (1991) (determining
that performance standards are "sufficiently detailed").
122. 49 M.S.P.R. 110 (1991).
123. See Smith v. Department of Energy, 49 M.S.P.R. 110, 115 (1991) (affirming AJ's find-
ings that invalidated performance standard).
124. See id- at 116 (noting that "sometimes" is so "vague and inexact that it is impossible
to apply in a verifiable fashion or to discover the level of proficiency which the [agency] actu-
ally intended by the phrase") (quoting Wilson v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 770
F.2d 1048, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
125. 47 M.S.P.R. 534 (1991), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
126. Sherrell v. Department of Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 534, 534-35 (1991), aff'd, 956 F.2d
1174 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
127. See id. at 540 (dismissing appellant's claim that performance standards were invalid).
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est particularly to the employment law practitioner. Note that
where an adverse personnel action is proposed under chapter 75 of
title 5128 due to an employee's alleged misconduct, the employing
agency must prove the misconduct by a preponderance of the
evidence. 129
1. Sexual harassment
Although its extensive procedural history is minimized in the
Board's latest rendition of Hillen v. Department of Army (Hilen IV), 130
the case has been proceeding between the full Board and an AJ for
more than six years. A series of remands has produced an unlikely
decision, considering the growing awareness in our country of the
issue of sexual harassment in the workplace.' 3' Taken as a whole,
however, the Hillen cases serve to trace the Board's evolving policy
trend in its treatment of sexual harassment cases.
In Hilen, the Army removed a senior executive for his sexual har-
assment of a female employee. 32 In its most recent decision in the
case,' 33 the Board held that where an agency alleges a violation of
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regula-
tions 13 4 under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964135 and merely
mentions agency policies or Office of Personnel Management
128. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7543 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991).
129. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2) (1992); see supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing adverse personnel action procedures and standards).
130. 54 M.S.P.R. 58 (1992), aft'gas modified, 50 M.S.P.R. 293 (1991), vacating 35 M.S.P.R.
453 (1987), rev' 29 M.S.P.R. 690 (1986).
131. See, e.g., Michele Galen et al., Sexual Harassment: Out of the Shadows, Bus. WK., Oct. 28,
1991, at 30 (examining reaction in American business community to Professor Anita Hill's
testimony regarding sexual harassment in Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas' Senate
confirmation hearings); Sexual Harassment in the Ranks, WASH. PosT, July 25, 1992, at A20 (dis-
cussing instances of sexual harassment in U.S. Navy and inability of Naval leaders to eradicate
problem).
132. Hillen v. Department of Army, 29 M.S.P.R. 690, 690 (1986) (Hillen 1), rev'd, 35
M.S.P.R. 453 (1987), vacated, 50 M.S.P.R. 293 (1991), aff'd as modified, 54 M.SP.R. 58 (1992).
Five women alleged numerous incidents of sexual harassment by the executive, who was their
supervisor, but the Board eventually considered only one woman's claims in Hillen IV. Hillen
IV, 54 M.S.P.R. at 59. Those charges originally included touching the victim's breast while in
an elevator, rubbing her buttocks and thigh while in her office, making suggestive comments
to her over the telephone without identifying himself, and repeatedly looking at her in a sexu-
ally suggestive manner. Hillen II, 35 M.S.P.R. at 454-55. The supervisor responded that, by
and large, the incidents described were examples of accidental or unintentional contact. Id. at
456-57. The Board sustained only one incident, the touching of the employee's buttocks and
thigh as she was bending over at an office coffee pot, as sexual harassment. Hillen IV, 54
M.S.P.R. at 68 (concluding that supervisor's touching was of deliberate and sexual nature).
133. Hillen IV, 54 M.S.P.R. at 58.
134. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991) (defining sexual harassment for purposes of employ-
ment discrimination).
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000e-17 (1988) (defining equal employment for purposes of
statute).
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(OPM) regulations in the charges,13 6 the employee has not received
sufficient notice of alternative or secondary charges under those
policies and regulations.' 3 7 The Board corrected an earlier error in
Hillen 111,138 holding that the title VII "hostile working environ-
ment" standard is conduct "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to "cre-
ate an abusive working environment."'13 9 Applying that standard to
the facts of the Hillen case, the Board found that the single instance
of sexual harassment sustained by the AJ was not, by itself, severe
enough to create a hostile and offensive environment.' 40 The Board
noted that the only case of single-incident harassment uncovered
and relied on by the agency was a situation in which the victim mani-
fested physical symptoms of psychological distress and required
psychiatric counseling. 4 1
The resulting sexual harassment standard is difficult to meet in a
pure title VII case before the MSPB. Where the victim alleges or
proves only a single incident of sexually harassing conduct, even if
the incident is severe, the Board may not be able to offer that em-
ployee the protection of sustaining the removal of the harassing su-
pervisor from the workplace. The agency can avoid this heavy
burden of proof under title VII, however, if it additionally charges
the harassing employee with an express violation of the agency's
standards of employee conduct.' 42
2. Indefinite suspensions
The indefinite suspension of an employee is often utilized in the
136. See Hillen IV, 54 M.S.P.R. at 64 (noting that agency alleged that appellant had created
intimidating and offensive work environment as specifically prohibited by 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1992)).
137. Hillen IV, 54 M.S.P.R. at 63.138. Hillen v. Department of Army, 50 M.S.P.R. 293 (1991) (Hillen III), aff'das modified, 54
M.S.P.R. 58 (1992).
139. Hillen IV, 54 M.S.P.R. at 65 (acknowledging MSPB's failure in Hillen III to follow
standard enumerated in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), which estab-
lished requirements for actionable sexual harassment charges under title VII).
140. Id. at 68-69. In applying a "reasonable woman" standard, the Board discounted the
complainant's subjective conclusion that the single alleged incident was sufficiently offensive
to create a hostile work environment. Id. The Board found significant the fact that "although
[the victim] was upset at the time by the unwelcome touching, she was not greatly concerned
by this or other incidents until she learned of the appellant's placement in her chain of com-
mand." Id. at 67. The Board's observation is rather peculiar because one might expect most
victims to become more greatly concerned upon learning that they may be subjected to cer-
tain behavior on a continuing basis.
141. Hillen IV, 54 M.S.P.R. at 69 (citing Campbell v. Kansas State Univ., 780 F. Supp. 755
(D. Kan. 1991)). The Board refused to apply the holding in Campbell to the case at bar be-
cause that case involved "aggravating circumstances" that the Hillen case did not. Id.
142. See Hillen IV, 54 M.S.P.R. at 63 (requiring that agency specifically charge employee
with violation of agency's standard of conduct, in addition to title VII violation, to effectuate
removal more easily).
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interim period between the time an employee is suspected of com-
mitting a crime and the time a final disposition in the employee's
criminal investigation or prosecution is reached. In 1991, the MSPB
decidedJones v. Department of Navy, 143 a case in which the Navy sus-
pended two employees' security clearances pending the agency's in-
ternal investigation of their alleged cocaine use and possession. 144
On remand to the Board from the Federal Circuit, the Board held
that an indefinite suspension need not be reversed where the sus-
pension was proper when effected.' 45 That is, if a suspension is
based on an indictment that is later rescinded or on a security clear-
ance investigation that ultimately uncovers no detrimental evidence,
the suspension will not necessarily be reversed.' 46
The decision in Jones departs significantly from prior cases in
which employees who have been indicted and are being prosecuted
can be suspended indefinitely without pay pending the outcome of
the criminal process. 47 InJones, no indictment or prosecution oc-
143. 48 M.S.P.R. 680 (1991).
144. Jones v. Department of Navy, 48 M.S.P.R. 680, 682 (1991). Without security clear-
ances, the employees could not perform their duties, so the Navy placed them on leave with
pay. Id. at 683. The employees then received an agency proposal for their indefinite suspen-
sion, without pay, and they appealed that adverse action. Id. at 683-84. The AJ sustained the
agency's proposal, and the MSPB held that the agency could invoke an indefinite suspension
with "reasonable cause" that a crime has been committed for which imprisonment may be
imposed. Id. at 689. The AJ noted that an agency may order or continue an employee's
indefinite suspension for possible criminal misconduct that could result in imprisonment,
even though no criminal proceedings are ongoing. Id
145. See Jones v. Department of Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 607, 609 (1991) (denying award of
back pay because indefinite suspension based on indictment that is later dismissed does not
have to be rescinded), on remand from No. 91-3530 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 1991). Note, however,
that in an indictment, a grand jury makes a factual determination based on evidence presented
by the Government regarding whether sufficient evidence exists to put a defendant on trial.
See United States v. R. Enterprise, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 722, 726 (1991) (explaining that role of
grand jury is to examine all information that may help its investigation of whether or not
crime has occurred). In Jones, the Naval Investigative Service presented the only evidence
against the employees, which consisted of indications that the employees were merely sus-
pected of drug use and possession. Jones, 51 M.S.P.R. at 609. In essence, therefore, the two
employees were deprived of pay for the suspension period by being targeted for an investiga-
tion that turned up no wrongdoing.
146. Jones, 51 M.S.P.R. at 609. The employees in Jones sought back pay by virtue of the
reversal of their indefinite suspensions. Id. The Board noted, however, that although it even-
tually cleared the employees of the alleged wrongdoing and reinstated their security clear-
ances, the existence of an agency security clearance investigation justified the agency's action
and its denial of back pay for the suspension period. See id. (stating that employees' clearance
of drug use and possession charges "merely reinforces ... prior determination [by Board in
Jones, 48 M.S.P.R. at 682], that the agency proved the existence of a bona-fide security clear-
ance investigation").
147. Cf, e.g., Wiemers v. MSPB, 792 F.2d 1113, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument
that because employee's suspension was based solely on indictment and removal was based in
part on conviction, reversal of conviction entitles reversal of removal and reinstatement with
backpay); Brown v. Department ofJustice, 715 F.2d 662, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting it is
well settled that acquittal does not entitle employee to reinstatement because agency may be
able to justify termination by proving employee's actual misconduct by preponderance of
evidence).
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curred and yet the employees' security clearances, which were nec-
essary for their work, were suspended indefinitely.1 48 Such a
holding could negatively affect employees whose security clearance
eligibility is under investigation for reasons completely unrelated to
any criminal process. 149 A remarkable feature of security clearance
cases and the factor that makes Jones a powerful tool for agencies is
the Supreme Court's position that an agency decision to suspend a
security clearance indefinitely is essentially nonreviewable. 150
3. Th eft
It is permissible for an agency wishing to discipline or remove an
employee who has not violated any specific rule or policy to neverthe-
less effect discipline or removal under chapter 75 of title 5 for such
cause as will "promote the efficiency of the [agency's] service."'' 1
Where the agency chooses to charge an employee with specific mis-
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense, however, it must allege
and prove the substantive elements of that criminal misconduct. A
recent case illustrates this point.
In Nazelrod v. Department ofJustice,152 the managers of a federal cor-
rectional institution in Kentucky demoted an employee on charges
of theft because the employee allegedly failed to post money to cer-
tain inmates' accounts and instead used the funds for personal pur-
poses. 5 3 Contrary to the AJ's finding, the MSPB held that the
agency did not prove the "specific intent" element of the crime of
theft because it had not shown that the employee intended to per-
manently deprive the owners of the possession or use of the
money. 154 This holding specifically overruled the MSPB's prior de-
cisions in Joy v. Department of Navy 155 and Major v. Department of
Navy 156 and brought the Board squarely in line with the Supreme
148. Jones, 48 M.S.P.R. at 682-85.
149. For example, it now seems possible that an employee undergoing a background
check because he or she has relatives living in a former Soviet-bloc country could see his or
her security clearance withheld indefinitely.
150. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 524 (1988) (holding that MSPB lacks
authority to review underlying reasons for agencies' denial of employee security clearances).
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (1988) (specifying basis for disciplinary action and termination).
152. 50 M.S.P.R. 456 (1991).
153. Nazelrod v. Department ofJustice, 50 M.S.P.R. 456, 458 (1991). An AJ upheld the
demotion, finding that the penalty imposed by the agency did not exceed the bounds of rea-
sonableness and that the employee's use of inmates' money to buy her lunch constituted theft.
Id. Further, the AJ concluded that the employee's intent to appropriate the property to a use
inconsistent with the owners' rights and benefits was sufficient to establish criminal intent. Id.
154. Id. at 460.
155. 24 M.S.P.R. 652, 654-55 (1984) (holding that intent to permanently deprive is not
requisite element of theft from agency), aft'd, 785 F.2d 322 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
156. 31 M.S.P.R. 283, 285-86 (1986) (finding that criminal intent is not diminished by
intent to replace stolen property).
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Court's decisions on this subject.'57
4. Prior records
An agency has considerable discretion in determining the appro-
priate penalty in a particular case. This discretion manifests itself
not only in the agency's decision to take disciplinary action in the
first place, but also in the type of information the agency consults in
deciding to implement a particular adverse personnel action. The
following case is illustrative of this point.
In Lewis v. Department of Air Force,158 the Air Force removed an em-
ployee for failing to request leave in accordance with standard pro-
cedures and for incurring one day of "absent without leave"
status. 15 9 The AJ mitigated the removal to a thirty-day suspension,
finding that the agency erred in considering the employee's past
leave and disciplinary record.' 60 The MSPB ruled, however, that
despite the fact that a prior disciplinary action is unrelated to the
facts of a present disciplinary action, the prior action may not be
discounted by the trier of fact in the present action.'6 1 Thus, the
practitioner should be aware of an employee's past disciplinary rec-
ord when representing that employee before an agency or the
Board, because an agency may lawfully consider unrelated, seem-
ingly insignificant past disciplinary actions in its present disciplinary
action determinations.
C. Affirmative Defense of "Not in Accordance with Law"
An agency disciplinary action that is not in accordance with law
157. See Nazelrod, 50 M.S.P.R. at 460 (following Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
271-72 (1952), which clarified distinction between stealing and knowing conversion). The
practitioner should be aware, however, of the "crime exception" under MSPB regulations. See
5 C.F.R. § 752.404(b)(3)(iii) (1992) (specifying agency's rights and authority where criminal
activity is suspected). Where an agency reasonably believes that an employee has committed
an act for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed, the usual 30-day notice period
is shortened to only seven days. Id. This allows the agency to preserve the integrity of the
workplace, but also greatly limits the employee's time to respond to charges before he or she
may be removed from the work environment.
158. 51 M.S.P.R. 475 (1991).
159. Lewis v. Department of Air Force, 51 M.S.P.R. 475, 475 (1991).
160. Id. at 485 (characterizing removal penalty as "unduly harsh"). The employee's past
record included a five-day Air Force suspension for a falsification that had occurred four years
earlier and a subsequent reprimand for quarreling. Id. at 484. Clearly, both charges were
unrelated to the present improper leave charges. See id. at 480 (discussing effect of em-
ployee's previous disciplinary record on agency's decision to remove him).
161. Id. at 483-84 (finding that employee's past disciplinary record is relevant to assess-
ment of current penalty). In addition, the Board held that "[a] prior action that is challenged
by the appellant will be discounted only if the prior action is clearly erroneous in the sense
that it leaves the Board with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted." Id. at 484.
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may be successfully challenged by an aggrieved employee. 162 This
type of action is distinguishable from a harmful procedural mistake
and instead involves an inquiry into whether the agency's decision is
unlawful in its entirety, or in other words, whether the agency's ac-
tion lacks legal authority. The burden of showing that an action is
not in accordance with law lies with the employee. 163
The first of the very few MSPB cases decided under this "not in
accordance with law" standard was Cuellar v. United States Postal Ser-
vice. 164 In Cuellar, the Board held that an OPM regulation permit-
ting an agency to place an employee on "emergency suspension"
without any procedural rights during the advance-notice period of a
removal action was invalid, and thus the "suspension" was not in
accordance with law and had to be reversed on the ground of
"harmful error."'1 5 The Federal Circuit further developed the not
in accordance with law standard in Handy v. United States Postal Ser-
vice. 16 6 In Handy, the court stated that the standard "is directed to
the [agency] decision itself" and looks to whether "the decision in
its entirety [is] in accordance with law."' 167
The MSPB's most recent decision under the not in accordance
with law standard is Stephen v. Department of Air Force.168 This case
dealt with the attempted termination of a probationary employee on
the date the employee would have completed one year of service,
but the Air Force failed to specify whether the termination was to be
effective prior to the end of the employee's one-year tour of duty. 169
The Board held that it could not assume that the agency intended
the termination to take effect prior to the time that the employee's
162. See Stephen v. Department of Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 684 (1991) (discussing
affirmative defense of "not in accordance with law" and holding that action should be re-
versed where no legal authority can sustain it). The affirmative defenses allowed on appeal
are enumerated at 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (e)(2) (1988) (specifying that defenses of "harmful error,"
"not in accordance with law," and "contrary to personnel practice" are sufficient to sustain
charge of wrongful personnel action by employee against employer-agency) and 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.56(5) (1992) (listing circumstances that prevent agencies from effectuating adverse
personnel actions).
163. Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R. at 684.
164. 8 M.S.P.R. 624 (1981).
165. Cuellar v. United States Postal Serv., 8 M.S.P.R. 624, 632 (1981) (reasoning that 30-
day notice requirement cannot be circumvented by unlawful emergency suspension action).
166. 754 F.2d 335 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
167. Handy v. United States Postal Serv., 754 F.2d 335, 337-38 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
168. 47 M.S.P.R. 672.
169. Stephen v. Department of Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 674 (1991). The one-year
anniversary date is highly significant because a Federal employee terminated prior to the end
of one year is still on "probation" and is entitled to very few of the procedural rights afforded
post-probationary federal employees under title 5. See 5 U.S.C. § 7501(1) (1988) (defining
"employee" for purposes of procedural protections under chapter 75 of title 5 as excluding
probationary employees).
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one-year probationary period ended. 170 As a result, the agency had
violated the notice and opportunity to respond requirements for
termination of nonprobationary employees.' 7 ' The Board went on
to find, however, that had the agency provided the employee with
minimal due process, the agency's action still would have been un-
lawful in its entirety because no legal authority existed for the
agency's action. 17 2
III. RETIREMENT CASES
Annuitants have certain protected rights under the Spouse Equity
Act 173 and the disability retirement provisions of title 5.174 These
protections include the election to provide a spouse or any other
individual with a survivor annuity and other related benefits. 175 As a
rule, the OPM prefers to rely on strict construction of time limits
and the concepts of estoppel and waiver to prevent potential benefi-
ciaries from obtaining annuity rights.' 76 Most often, the MSPB and
the Federal Circuit acquiesce in the OPM's determination. This is
particularly true of Spouse Equity Act cases.' 77 On occasion, how-
170. Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R. at 679-80.
171. Id at 688 (concluding that employee must be afforded 30-day notice of pending per-
sonnel action and be given opportunity to counter alleged wrongdoing, as required by 5
U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1), (2) (1988)).
172. See Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R. at 684 (holding that agency's impermissible action consti-
tutes harmful error even where other safeguards are met). In Stephen, the Board discussed, as
a second example of illegal agency action, the similar fact patterns found in Cuellar v. United
States Postal Service, 8 M.S.P.R. 624 (1981), and Littlejohn v. United States Postal Service, 25
M.S.P.R. 478 (1984). Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R. at 685. These cases involved situations in which
indefinite suspensions were effected during the advance-notice periods of removal actions,
followed by removals for the same acts of misconduct that led to the suspensions. Under this
fact pattern, the Postal Service improperly advanced employees' removals to the effective date
of their suspensions. Littlejohn, 25 M.S.P.R. at 479; Cuellar, 8 M.S.P.R. at 626. The remedy in
Littlejohn was to cancel the suspension and award back pay and benefits to the employee for
the period of time that he should have been working during the illegal suspension until his
lawful removal. Littlejohn, 25 M.S.P.R. at 485.
173. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8339(j)-(k) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (enumerating retirement bene-
fits due surviving spouses of former agency employees); 5 C.F.R. § 831.612(a)(2) (1992) (pro-
viding for transfer of retirement benefits accrued by deceased federal employees to their
surviving spouses).
174. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8451-8456 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (addressing rights of agency em-
ployees who retire due to job-related disabilities).
175. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8339(j)-(k) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (permitting payment of pension
benefits to surviving spouse or designated beneficiary of deceased agency employee).
176. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (discussing application of OPM time
limits and interpretation of estoppel and waiver principles).
177. See, e.g., Grunewald v. Office of Personnel Management, 49 M.S.P.R. 579, 582 (1991)
(holding that erroneous advice from OPM does not estop OPM from enforcing strict filing
deadline); Nones v. Office of Personnel Management, 47 M.S.P.R. 481, 485 (1991) (denying
annuity because of failure to comply with strict OPM one-year filing deadline), aff'd, 954 F.2d
734 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Bohannon v. Office of Personnel Management, 47 M.S.P.R. 114, 117
(1991) (stating that there is no OPM duty to advise former spouse of deadline and denying
OPM discretion to waive deadline); Kearby v. Office of Personnel Management, 47 M.S.P.R.
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ever, minor exceptions will be formulated, usually where the OPM
has failed to afford the beneficiary certain rights and the intent of
the parties is clearly at odds with the OPM's interpretation. 178
Under the disability retirement provisions of title 5,179 one can ex-
pect similar strict treatment from OPM, MSPB, and the Federal Cir-
cuit, generally based on the same issues of timeliness, waiver, and
estoppel. i8 0
IV. LACHES
The affirmative defense of laches is a classic agency defense when
dealing with employees, especially pro se employees, who appear to
have slept on their rights. The status of this doctrine is illustrated in
Cornetta v. United States.' 8' The Federal Circuit held in Cornetta that
an agency not only must show the employee's unreasonable and in-
excusable delay in pursuing an action, but also a resulting prejudice
to the agency's case. 182
A more recent decision by the Federal Circuit, which overturned
the Board's use of laches as a bar to an appeal, is not only illustra-
tive of the longevity of this doctrine's utilization at the Board, but is
also instructive on the practical difficulties in proving the elements
of the laches defense. In Hoover v. Department of Navy,' 8 3 an em-
ployee appealed a Board decision dismissing his petition for review
34, 38 (1991) (holding that OPM failure to notify spouse of deadline and resultant loss of
annuity are not actionable).
178. See, e.g., Harris v. Office of Personnel Management, 888 F.2d 121, 125 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (stating that although OPM cannot be estopped from denying annuity to survivor, fail-
ure to provide annual notice to retirees regarding elections available under 5 U.S.C.
§ 8339(j) and (k) may constitute waiver of one-year time limit); Kolbe v. Office of Personnel
Management, 32 M.S.P.R. 626, 631 (1987) (ruling that OPM failure to provide required no-
tice of elections under 5 U.S.C. § 8339(j) constitutes waiver of statutory limits, thus permit-
ting clear intent of decedent to be honored).
179. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8451-8456 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
180. See, e.g., Stevenson-Phillips v. Office of Personnel Management, 48 M.S.P.R. 527, 532
(1991) (deciding that employee's filing of application with agency did not constitute filing with
OPM and thus was untimely and OPM was not equitably estopped from enforcing strict one-
year deadline); Schulz v. Office of Personnel Management, 48 M.S.P.R. 520, 524-25 (1991)
(holding that neither erroneous advice from employing agency nor agency's failure to forward
application in timely fashion could estop OPM from denying annuity); Logan v. Office of
Personnel Management, 48 M.S.P.R. 381, 385-86 (1991) (raising issues of timeliness and es-
toppel); Campbell v. Office of Personnel Management, 48 M.S.P.R. 365, 370 (1991) (allowing
OPM to deny benefits to worker whose application was timely yet erroneously filed with
agency instead of OPM); Brennan v. Office of Personnel Management, 48 M.S.P.R. 359, 365
(1991) (disallowing disability benefits where application was received by employing agency
within one-year statutory period but was not received by OPM until 14 months had elapsed).
181. 851 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
182. See Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing mani-
festations of prejudice to agency as including either "economic" or "defense" prejudice
caused by inevitable loss of records, destruction of evidence, fading memories, or unavailabil-
ity of witnesses due to passage of time).
183. 957 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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on the ground of laches.18 4 The agency asserted that the em-
ployee's unreasonable delay of nearly five years prejudiced its ability
to raise a defense on the merits.18 5 The court ruled, however, that
an agency's showing that important witnesses have merely retired
does not satisfy the agency's burden of showing defense preju-
dice18 6 and that the agency's personnel expert was able to recon-
struct the events and prior agency organization so well that his
affidavit ironically helped to negate any claim of defense prejudice
by the agency.18 7
The practitioner should be aware of the laches defense as an
agency tool for seeking dismissal of appeals to the MSPB. The prac-
titioner should encourage employees to press their claims in a
timely fashion because the Board appears receptive to use of the
laches argument by agencies. s8  One caveat highlighted by the Hoo-
ver case is that, on the issue of defense prejudice, it is possible for an
agency to go too far in attempting to prove its inability to defend a
case.189
184. Hoover v. Department of Navy, 957 F.2d 861, 862-63 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
185. Id. at 863. The agency claimed that certain key witnesses were unavailable due to the
passage of time, and that it was impossible to reconstruct the complex personnel and organi-
zational evolution of the agency since the occurrence of the events in question in 1985. Id.
The agency supplied the affidavit of a personnel expert to illustrate the complex structural
changes within the agency that would supposedly hinder an accurate reconstruction of the
events and agency organization existing at that time. Id.
186. Id. at 863-64.
187. Id. at 864. The court explained the significance of the affidavit of the Navy's person-
nel expert as follows:
As evidence of the reorganization and growth of the agency since 1985, the agency
submitted the affidavit of Otis Sanders, an agency personnel employee since 1979
familiar with the organization of the agency, setting forth the history of the positions
occupied by Hoover [the appellant-employee] prior to the RIF [Reduction in Force],
and subsequent evolution of the post-RIF positions. Although the agency maintains
that reconstruction of the relevant events is burdensonte, there was no assertion that
the information is not available. Mr. Sanders averred personal knowledge of the
positions involved as well as the restructuring of the agency. The Sanders affidavit
that was submitted by the agency to support its assertions of substantial growth be-
lies the agency's assertion that reconstruction is so difficult that the defense is
prejudiced.
Id
188. See, e.g., id. at 863 (upholding agency's argument of laches in spite of Board's own
observation that, at the time of its 1985 decision, "Board regulations provided no time frame
for filing a petition for enforcement"). Even though no time limit existed, the Board invoked
the doctrine of laches and dismissed the petition. Id.
189. See id at 864 (finding that affidavit of agency employee demonstrated availability of
additional information to agency). In Hoover, the agency contended that it lacked the re-
sources and knowledge to provide information on previous employment positions. Id. To
bolster this assertion, the agency made use of a retired employee's affidavit, in which the
retiree stated that the agency had experienced substantial growth. Id. The court found in-
stead that the retiree's familiarity with the number and nature of agency employment posi-
tions before and after the growth detailed in the affidavit was indicative of the fact that the
agency could, albeit with some difficulty, provide the necessary information. Id.
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V. DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE: THE AJ's TOOL TO
DELAY ADJUDICATION
In its reports to Congress, the MSPB has long emphasized the
efficiency and speed with which it adjudicates federal employee ap-
peals under the strict time limits imposed by tide 5.190 The MSPB
has a policy of adjudicating at least an initial decision on its cases
within 120 days of the date an appeal is filed. 191 Because the MSPB
answers to Congress, and because the AJs employed by the MSPB
answer to the Board, it is logical to conclude that timeliness is a
dominant concern in the minds of most AJs. Although not all ap-
peals are capable of fair and adequate treatment in 120 days, AJs are
understandably hesitant to grant motions for continuances that
would delay adjudication, thus jeopardizing the Board's reputation
for speedy justice. 192
This fact of life at the MSPB provides AJs with a clear incentive to
find alternative ways to handle those cases that defy quick resolu-
tion. For example, if an AJ encounters a particularly complex case
with numerous items of documentary evidence, the AJ may wish to
dismiss the case without prejudice to the employee's refiling in the
near future to give both parties sufficient time to analyze and pre-
pare the case.' 93
While not all cases before the MSPB are so complicated or volu-
minous, the fact is that any case that taxes an appellant's ability to
become fully prepared in a timely manner automatically favors the
Government. Generally, an agency, when preparing to take an ad-
verse action against an employee, has the opportunity to organize
190. See, e.g., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that more than 98% of
initial appeals are processed within 120 days of filing); 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at
15 (noting that more than 997o of initial appeals are handled within 120 days).
191. See 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 (indicating that MSPB is successful in
meeting 120-day deadline in vast majority of appeals).
192. The procedural distinction between a "continuance" and a "dismissal without preju-
dice to refiling" is crucial. The former delays adjudication but leaves the clock running, while
the latter eliminates the case from the docket indefinitely, thereby halting the adjudication
clock and preserving the Board's record on timeliness. See 33 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS
EDITION § 77:31 (Law. Co-op. 1981) (defining "continuance" as "adjournment of a cause to a
future date"); 5JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 41.05[2], at 41.66 (2d
ed. 1992) (defining "dismissed without prejudice" as "leav[ing] the situation so far as proce-
dures therein are concerned the same as though the suit had never been brought").
193. See, e.g., Neubeiser v. FERC, 47 M.S.P.R. 125, 127 (1991) (commenting that AJ prop-
erly dismissed case without prejudice to avoid exceeding 120-day time limit for processing
appeals). This practice may already be commonplace, although neither the Board's Annual
Reports nor the MSPB Office of Management Analysis has published the actual number or
percentage of cases resolved by this device. Depending on how widespread the use of this
technique is or becomes, one might reasonably expect its utilization to have some influence
on the relatively low average time of disposition of appeals filed with the Board, which cur-
rently stands at 74 days. 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 28.
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and analyze all relevant materials before proposing the adverse ac-
tion. Once the action is proposed, the employee and his or her at-
torney must expend a great deal of energy to become as prepared as
the agency. Therefore, dismissal of the case without prejudice to
the employee's refiling is a tool that AJs can use to protect employ-
ees and their representatives from succumbing to this inherent dis-
advantage built into the MSPB appeal system.
Recently, the Board decided appeals regarding the propriety of
granting dismissals without prejudice. In Thomas v. Department of Vet-
erans Affairs, 19 4 the Board considered whether an AJ may dismiss a
case without prejudice for the convenience of the agency. 95 As a
rule, the MSPB found that the employee's financial burden of refil-
ing, the agency's ability to anticipate delay and preserve testimony,
and the availability of alternative sources of proof should be consid-
ered in deciding whether to grant an agency's request for a post-
ponement or continuance. 196
In early 1992, the Board again confronted this issue in Moore v.
Department of Treasury.197 In that case, the Treasury Department in-
definitely suspended an employee based on a federal criminal indict-
ment of the employee for unlawfully disclosing tax return
information. 198 The employee filed an appeal, but prior to the hear-
ing he was incarcerated for evaluation of his mental competency and
for threatening a public official.19 9 The full Board was disinclined to
allow a dismissal without prejudice and instead urged the AJ to ex-
plore the possibility of holding a hearing, despite the appellant's ap-
194. 51 M.S.P.R. 218 (1991).
195. Thomas v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 51 M.S.P.R. 218, 221 (1991) (considering
whether dismissal without prejudice is appropriate where agency is party that caused delay).
The agency removed an employee, a pipefitter's helper, for sleeping and being intoxicated on
duty. Id at 218. The employee appealed his removal to the Board, but at a prehearing con-
ference the AJ granted the agency's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. Id. at 219.
The agency filed its motion for dismissal because one of its primary witnesses was scheduled
for open heart surgery that week. Id. at 219-20. The employee objected to the agency's mo-
tion and appealed the AJ's decision to the Board. Id The MSPB held that an agency's motion
to dismiss should not be granted under circumstances such as these and that the appellant
should not face the additional financial burden of refiling an appeal.
196. Id at 221.
197. 52 M.S.P.R. 362 (1992).
198. Moore v. Department of Treasury, 52 M.S.P.R. 362, 362 (1992).
199. Id. at 362-63. Thereafter, the employee refused to participate in a bearing either at
the prison or by telephone, declined an invitation to request a dismissal without prejudice,
and was made temporarily inaccessible by virtue of his relocation within the prison system. Id.
The AJ issued an initial decision dismissing the employee's pro se appeal without prejudice
based on the temporary unavailability of the employee and the general propriety of sus-
pending administrative proceedings pending resolution of concurrent criminal proceedings.
Id. at 363. The Board disagreed, however, ruling that the AJ must take additional steps to
schedule a hearing for the employee. Id.
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parent unavailability. 200 The Board also urged the AJ to inform the
appellant that an unreasonable refusal to participate could be
viewed as a waiver of his right to a hearing, meaning that a continu-
ance might be preferable to dismissal without prejudice.20 1
In the future, as AJs' caseloads increase, particularly troublesome
or complex cases may routinely be dismissed without prejudice.
Also, cases in which pressing concerns arise, such as the appellant's
health or other personal circumstances, may warrant dismissal with-
out prejudice. It is important, however, to recognize the burden
that refiling may place on an appellant and to minimize the use of
this tool in situations where, for example, the appellant prefers a
continuance. 20 2
VI. ATrORNEY'S FEES
Attorney's fees are available only under limited circumstances, as
set forth by statute. Prominent examples of statutes that allow pre-
vailing employees to be reimbursed by the Government for their at-
torneys' fees are provisions of the Back Pay Act,20 3 the Equal Access
to Justice Act,20 4  the Civil Rights Act of 1964,205 and the
Whistleblower Protection Act.20 6 These so called "fee shifting"
200. Id. at 363-64.
201. lId
202. For example, where a case is dismissed pending the judicial determination of related
issues, the appellant may be held to strict refiling deadlines following the final disposition of
the related matters. See, e.g., Neubeiser v. FERC, 47 M.S.P.R. 125, 127 (1991) (dismissing
employee's claim to allow time for final disposition of related issue by agency, but requiring
employee to refile no sooner than 46 days and no later than 65 days after date of issuance of
initial decision on related issue).
203. See 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) (1988) (providing that MSPB may award attorney's fees under
this provision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (1988)). When an employee of an agency
has lost pay due to an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action by an agency, he or she is
entitled to recover previously witheld salary, benefits, and attorney's fees. Id The employee
is entitled to this recovery "on correction of the personnel action," or, in other words, when
the agency's personnel action is reversed. Id. Section 7701 (g)(1) illustrates the point that an
employee must show that the Government did not prevail in order to collect attorney's fees. 5
U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (1988). The employee must show that he or she is the prevailing party,
and it must be determined by the Board or an AJ that payment is warranted by the "interest of
justice." Id The latter point includes cases in which the agency's action was "clearly without
merit." Id The Board has implemented the Back Pay Act through regulations at 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.37 (1992).
204. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988) (providing for attorney's fees to be paid to prevailing party,
other than U.S. Government, arising from adverse proceedings brought by agency); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1988) (providing award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties who are subject to suit
at Government's initiative to same extent that prevailing parties would recover under com-
mon law or by statute).
205. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1992) (addressing payment of attorney's fees in
cases of civil rights violations).
206. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g) (Supp. III 1991) (awarding attorney's fees to employees who
suffer adverse personnel actions on basis of making protected statements to authorities about
improper actions or activities of regulatory agency or its officials).
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statutes alter the normal course of attorney's fee payment, which in
the United States requires each side to pay its own fees.20 7 In order
to qualify for reimbursement under these various statutes, an em-
ployee must show either that the Government did not prevail or that
the Government's position was, to one degree or another,
unjustified. 208
A. Recent MSPB Cases
In Mitchell v. Department of Navy, 209 the Navy placed an employee
on enforced leave for his physical inability to perform his job assign-
ments. 210 The same day that he was placed on leave, the agency
proposed that the employee be removed for other, unrelated rea-
sons. 211 When the agency effected his removal the employee ap-
pealed, but was later able to reach a settlement with the agency. 21 2
The employee filed a motion for attorney's fees, but the AJ con-
cluded that because the agency attempted to accommodate the em-
ployee, a fee award was not warranted in the interest of justice.21 3
The MSPB held that the determination as to whether a fee award is
warranted in the interest of justice should be made on the basis of
the existing record, even where that record is incomplete. 214
207. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1974) (stating that
American rule with respect to attorney's fees is that such fees are generally not recoverable by
prevailing party in lawsuit).
208. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1992) (positing that for violations of Civil
Rights Act of 1964, employee need only "substantially prevail" in order to receive attorney's
fees). Under the Back Pay Act, an employee must be awarded a reversal of the agency's per-
sonnel action, along with his or her previously withheld salary, in order to receive attorney's
fees. 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) (1988). Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the employee must
show that the Government's position was "not substantially justified" in order to receive at-
torney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). Finally, in order to receive attorney's fees related to
an MSPB appeal, an employee must show that the "interest of justice" warrants such an
award. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (1988) (requiring agency to pay employee's reasonable at-
torney's fees where agency engaged in prohibited personnel practice that was without merit).
209. 51 M.S.P.R. 103 (1991).
210. Mitchell v. Department of Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 103, 108 (1991) (noting existence of
injury to employee's arm that impeded his performance of his duties).
211. See id. (noting that employee was removed, not because of his arm injury, but because
employee had refused rehabilitation assistance for drug dependency as well as attendance
problems caused by dependency).
212. See id. (discussing agreement by agency to retroactively restore appellant to his previ-
ously held position).
213. See id at 110 (finding no evidence of discrimination and hence no basis for award of
attorney's fees). It is noteworthy that there was no hearing and no opportunity for the pres-
entation of bipartisan evidence. The AJ relied instead on a transcript of an investigatory in-
terview with the employee during which the employee had first notified the agency of his drug
dependency. Id
214. Id at 112. The Board rationalized that the employee relinquished his right to a hear-
ing on the fee award by settling the case without submitting evidence of agency error, and that
a new trial should not ensue from a fee award. See id at 111 (noting that request for attorney's
fees "'should not result in a second major litigation' ") (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
SuRVEY OF MSPB CASES IN 1991-1992
In Jones v. Department of Navy, 215 the Navy denied an employee a
recurrence of disability determination and placed him on leave with-
out pay status between 1986 and 1990, at which time the employee
finally returned to work. 21 6 The employee appealed this "construc-
tive suspension," and the AJ overturned the agency's action, award-
ing the employee attorney's fees but denying his fee enhancement
request despite the existence of a contingency fee agreement.2 17
On appeal to the MSPB, the Board found that if the unavailability of
an enhanced fee would cause an appellant to experience substantial
difficulty in obtaining counsel to represent him or her in an employ-
ment case, such an enhancement may be granted.2 18 The Board
held, however, that in the case before it, the employee did not sub-
mit the kind of detailed evidence necessary to support the requested
enhancement. 219
In Rothschild v. Department of Housing & Urban Development,220 an
employee appealed a number of issues to the Board, but only pre-
vailed on some of his claims for relief.22 1 In determining whether
the employee's representatives were entitled to recover attorneys'
fees, the Board discussed a third factor, the ultimate results of the
attorneys' efforts, along with the two factors normally considered in
awarding attorney's fees, which are the number of hours expended
and the reasonableness of the hourly rate. 222 Finally, the Board re-
manded the issue of whether an enhanced fee could be awarded due
to the contingent nature of the fee agreement, where the attorney
sought an enhancement of 100%.223
215. 51 M.S.P.R. 542 (1991).
216. Jones v. Department of Navy, 51 M.S.P.R. 542, 544-45 (1991).
217. Id.
218. See ici (holding that employee also must demonstrate that contingency fee arrange-
ment is present in relevant action).
219. Id. at 548. As a result, the Board remanded the case to develop the record with
regard to the fee enhancement and for issuance of a new initial decision. Id
220. 54 M.S.P.R. 238 (1992).
221. Rothschild v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 54 M.S.P.R. 238, 242 (1992). The
Board held that the employee could recover attorney's fees for efforts in seeking a mandamus
order because those efforts led to the employee's ultimate victory on the underlying issues.
Id. at 242 (noting relationship between mandamus order and reinstatement of employee). On
the other hand, the Board held that the employee could not recover attorney's fees for the
work done in applying for a stay where the stay was denied, even though the request for a stay
was nonfrivolous and appeared directly related to the issues on which the employee prevailed.
Id. at 242-43.
222. Id. at 242.
223. Id- at 244-45. At the time Rothschild was heard, the Board had only dealt with stan-
dard contingency fee enhancement involving cases in the Seattle, Washington area. Id- at
244. There, the standard enhancement was 20%. Id. On remand in Rothschild, the em-
ployee's counsel would be permitted to introduce evidence showing the unavailability of fed-
eral employment lawyers in Washington, D.C., where jurisdiction had been set in Rothschild, at
the 20% enhancement rate. Id. at 244-45.
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B. Attorney's Fee Appeals Outside the MSPB
Because not all adverse personnel actions are appealable to the
MSPB,224 not all attorney's fee issues are eligible to be heard by the
MSPB. Where an underlying personnel action is not appealable to
the MSPB, an agency's decision to deny attorney's fee reimburse-
ment is also not appealable to the MSPB.225 Take the example of an
employee who files a grievance based on a five-day suspension and
subsequently receives a favorable agency decision rescinding the
suspension. While the employee may win an award of backpay for
the five days of missed work, he or she may nevertheless encounter
the unwillingness of the agency to reimburse his or her attorney's
fees. The employee has three avenues of recourse.
First, if the amount of attorney's fees is considerable, the em-
ployee may consider filing suit in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims. 226 This strategy only makes sense from a monetary stand-
point if the employee can afford to pay the additional attorney's fees
required to file suit at the Court of Federal Claims.2 27 The em-
ployee risks a loss before that court, whereupon he or she would not
be entitled to attorney's fees for either the initial grievance or the
Court of Federal Claims efforts. 228
Second, in cases where the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction
may be questionable, the refusal of an agency to pay attorney's fees
pursuant to a grievance may be litigated in federal district court. In
Maney v. Department of Health & Human Services,229 the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia ordered a federal agency to pay
an employee's attorney's fees under the Back Pay Act after the em-
224. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7503 (1988) (denying employee who is suspended for less than 14
days right of appeal to MSPB).
225. The MSPB, the EEOC, and the courts entertain both substantive and attorney's fee
issues on appeal, generally dealing with the merits of a case before reaching the issue of
whether reimbursement for attorney's fees may be obtained in a given case.
226. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988) (establishing Court of Federal Claims' authority to
hear attorney's fee suits).
227. See id (failing to specify jurisdictional minimum in size of claim that may be brought).
The effort required in a Court of Federal Claims action to recover fees is only economically
feasible, however, if the amount of fees at stake is large.
228. See, e.g., Cuthberson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., No. 91-0863, 1992 WL
174634, at * 1-2 (Cl. Ct. July 6, 1992) (denying attorney's fees where Court of Federal Claims
lacked jurisdiction to hear underlying substantive claim). Because the Court of Federal
Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear federal employment issues or enforce federal employment
claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988) (establishing cases over which Court of Federal Claims
exercises jurisdiction), it is possible that the Court of Federal Claims would decline to hear an
attorney's fee case on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. But see Aijo v.
United States, 26 CL. Ct. 432, 436 (1992) (holding that Federal Bureau of Engraving and
Printing conceded issue of liability for attorney's fees under Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991), by challenging only reasonable amount of fees owed).
229. 637 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986).
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ployee prevailed in his grievance. 23 0
Finally, if the amount of attorney's fees is worth pursuing but is
not significant enough to warrant filing suit in the Court of Federal
Claims or district court, the employee may appeal to the Comptrol-
ler General of the United States, who heads the enforcement mecha-
nism of the General Accounting Office. 23 ' While the Comptroller
General may not always be willing to order an agency to disburse
funds for the payment of attorney's fees, such an order is not alto-
gether unlikely.
CONCLUSION
During 1991 and 1992, the MSPB has continued its role of pro-
viding guidance to the practitioner in federal employment law. For
most situations, sufficient precedent now exists that an agency
should have clear knowledge about what types of actions will be sus-
tained and should know when to consider withdrawing an adverse
action against one of its employees. The Board continues to be gen-
erally supportive of the basic decisions made by agency manage-
ment. In fact, the Board has even approved a new tool, that of
indefinite suspension without pay during security clearance investi-
gations, to give agencies greater authority than previously recog-
nized.
The MSPB has handled its increased jurisdiction from the
Whistleblower Protection Act in part by limiting the types of cases
the Board considers to be protected by the Act. This issue is subject
to review and final decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Decisions on other whistleblower issues such as
nexus and constructive knowledge appear to have not always been
consistent.
The past two years have seen the Board provide clearer guidance
in the areas of performance standards, misconduct cases, and attor-
ney's fees. Increased attention to due process, as opposed to a nar-
row focus on being an efficient adjudicator of cases, has surfaced
through the Board's decisions limiting dismissal without prejudice
and requiring continuances in appropriate cases. This emphasis on
230. Maney v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 637 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (D.D.C.
1986).
231. The GAO, as an arm of Congress, is charged with oversight of all executive agencies.
The enforcement arm of the GAO, the Office of the Comptroller General, publishes decisions
that have precedential value and are binding on agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 2304 (1988) ("Gen-
eral Accounting Office shall conduct audits and reviews to assure compliance with the laws,
rules, and regulations governing employment in the executive branch... to assess the effec-
tiveness and soundness of Federal personnel management.").
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due process over efficiency appears unlikely to affect the Board's de-
served reputation for prompt resolution of federal personnel cases.
